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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

MORE UNREST SEEN IN PERSIAN GULF STATES DUE TO IRANIAN CRISIS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21 Nov 79 p 51

[Article by 'Ali Hashim: "The Confrontation Could Inflame the Area"]

[Text] The Gulf states are without a doubt lining up behind Iran, but they are doing so silently. They want Washington to be dealt a blow, but they are not declaring this openly because the United States is the largest importer of Gulf oil.

Despite the references of Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the Revolutionary Council member responsible for Iranian foreign affairs, to the position of the Arab foreign ministers on the Iranian-American confrontation and the effort to push them into taking a definite position, the Gulf oil states have considered that this confrontation is "political," and the OPEC organization to which they belong is not allowed to "involve itself in a political confrontation."

The embarrassment still exists, as does the fear that the Islamic revolution or the United States itself may stage a dramatic action against Tehran, whereupon the Persian Gulf states would fall into a barrel of their oil which is so expensive. Then it would be inevitable that these states take a position and that Gulf oil be brought into the confrontation which could cause the entire area to explode.

There is more than one indication in the Gulf arena of the nervousness and apprehensions of the officials.

The Strait of Hormuz, the main oil artery, was the subject of references made by Oman's Sultan Qabus in his speech on the occasion of the national anniversary of the sultanate. The sultan suggested that the main threat is from the Soviet Union and affirmed the sultanate's responsibility in protecting the strait, the necessity that the states of the area share this responsibility, and the necessity that the states which consume the area's oil participate, if only in paying the expenses. The real clarification came in the sultan's announcement that his country rejected "the establishment of any foreign base in the area" and was opposed to foreign interference.

Accordingly, Kuwaiti Deputy Foreign Minister Rashid 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Rashid denied that an American landing had occurred in Kuwait or Bahrain, regarding these reports as an insult to the independent policy of Kuwait and the area states.

Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources, said that Iran had not asked the OPEC states to take any position on its crisis with Washington, and added that: "The organization has no connection with any political problems that occur between a member state and other states."

Moreover, the Arab states which overlook the Gulf confirmed that they will continue using the dollar to measure the value of oil revenues even if Iran decides to replace it.

However, the storm which has raged over the Gulf since the success of Ayatollah Khomeyni's revolution and has become a hurricane threatening the United States is strengthening the sympathies of the people of the Gulf, even if it has not strengthened the sympathies of the Gulf shaykhs. One of Khomeyni's messages aimed at the Gulf area stating the necessity of using the weapon of cutting off Washington's oil could cause big complications, which would involve the area states in a confrontation with their peoples because of the hatred these peoples harbor for Washington.

Nerves are still strained, the situation in the Gulf remains difficult, the indications abound, and the days of the Gulf are pregnant with events which are still in the mind of Providence.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

REPRESENTATIVES OF LIBERATION ORGANIZATIONS DISCUSS IRAN, PERSIAN GULF STATES

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 18 Nov 79 p 13

[Article: "Dialog With Six Gulf Organizations on the Iranian Revolution and Its Impact on the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] In Lisbon, amid the flood of discussions which took place concerning the central Arab problem, Palestine, AL-SAFIR took advantage of the presence of several representatives of national liberation and political opposition movements from the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula to conduct extended interviews with them concerning current conditions in this vital and strategic area.

The discussions materialized and concentrated on: "The Iranian Revolution, Its Effects and Repercussions in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horizon of Nationalist Action in Light of these Effects."

The following individuals participated in the meeting:

1. Sa'id Mas'ud, Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman [PFLO]
2. 'Abdallah Muhammad, Kuwaiti Democratic Grouping
3. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mahmud, Bahrain National Liberation Front [NLF-Bahrain]
4. Yahya al-Shami, YAR Democratic National Front
5. Husayn Musa, Popular Front-Bahrain
6. 'Abd-al Wakil al-Sururi, Yemeni Socialist Party

1. Sa'id Mas'ud, PFLO

Talking about the Iranian revolution in itself is enjoyable and encouraging, because the revolution came at a time when the revolutionary forces throughout the Gulf and the Peninsula were in a state of noticeable ebb.

There was an assault on the Omani revolution and an assault on democratic freedoms throughout the area, and reactionism was maliciously implementing its plans throughout the area. In addition, there was the military attack which we in Oman faced from the shah.

People's morale was so low that they believed that since the shah was protecting these regimes, it was impossible to achieve anything. The Iranian revolution came at this very time to fortify internal conditions on the popular level and deal a blow to the imperialist plan. We in Oman were the ones who benefited most from the Iranian revolution through the withdrawal of the Iranian forces from our country, to say nothing of the Iranian withdrawal and its effects throughout the area. The Iranian withdrawal took place rapidly. We expected that the situation would be transformed after the withdrawal, because the shah had supported Qabus and the Iranian revolution would directly support the revolution in Oman as a reaction against this.

Many people expected that the revolution would be transformed into its counterpart.

The shah sided with the agent authorities in Muscat. What was wanted from the Iranian revolution was that it directly support the revolution in Oman on the basis that this was the realistic and proper course for this kind of revolution to follow. But in the event, this did not come about. What did come about was that meetings were held with representatives of the Iranian revolution, and this in itself also contributed something positive in the context of the situation in Oman as a whole. The regime was stunned. It actually was stunned. It began to stumble about from the matter of Camp David and its loud support to seeking help from foreign forces. This finally brought it to the point of opening offices in Pakistan, indicating its fear. Recruitment offices in Lahore, in three areas of Pakistan.

Of course, we do not have any Shi'ites in Oman except for a very small percentage, in Muscat in particular. The Hyderabadis--that is, the Hyderabad community--are the representatives of the Shi'ite movement. They have business places and are the only ones who compete with the Hindus in the business market. They have practical positions against the previous regime.

In Oman we have Ibadism, which is a deep-rooted sect whose members form the majority in Oman's interior. However, the sectarian problem has not yet been raised in Oman, and there is no sectarian discrimination.

Moreover, the nationalist movement in the area--and in particular the PFLO, which is the main movement in this arena--is also fighting this problem, whether on a sectarian, class, or group basis--such as saying that these people are Bedouins and these are town dwellers, and so on. Despite the fact that the authorities have recently begun raising this issue: the Bedouins, the problem of the group in the interior of Oman, the Muscat group, the urban group, etc.

Generally speaking, it can be said that the Iranian revolution is really having a positive and far-reaching effect on the area as a whole, and especially the area of Oman.

We still think that more is required from the Iranian revolution than is being done, although we appreciate the revolution's problems and the internal difficulties and foreign plots it is facing. Nevertheless, we believe that the Iranian revolution still has a long road ahead of it before it will yield the results which the national forces in the area expect--before it will have stronger repercussions.

The solving of the Iranian revolution's internal problems will enable us to benefit more from the Iranians. Moreover, any role which the Iranian revolution performs in the area will be beneficial to us, even if it is in the framework of the nonaligned movement.

This is a brief summary of the effects of the Iranian revolution.

As for the horizon of action in Oman at present, this action has been very productive. For example, in the interior of Oman the regime has become more exposed, and the masses have begun to feel that there is support for them, irrespective of the sectarian view. The view of Iran for the masses in Oman at this time is an optimistic one, and actually an encouraging one to a considerable extent.

The people have begun to talk on the street, and this is the start of the effects of the revolution. This is in the context of the horizon of future action, and is subject to Oman's internal conditions. Because the external factor is effective, but it remains subject to the state of nationalist action inside the country.

2. 'Abdallah Muhammad, Kuwaiti Democratic Grouping

The special character of the Iranian situation is conspicuous for Kuwait, although in a different way. For in terms of its geographical position, Kuwait is surrounded by three big countries in the area: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Without doubt, the effort to strike a balance among these regimes has been one of the elements in the political equation in order for the regime and the situation in Kuwait to remain as they are. Historically, there have been popular Kuwaiti aspirations to be closely united in a unitary framework.

In the 1930's there was a unionist movement with Iraq. Of course, it did not succeed, but this idea whether on the level of the authorities or on the level of the people has always existed. Thus, joining or uniting in a union with Iraq, for example, or with Iraq and Syria, is considered one of the equations which would change the balances in Kuwait and thus affect the region. The existence of the previous Iranian regime was a balancing factor which suspended Kuwait's relations with any Arab unitary form. This is from the standpoint of what is called geopolitics, or the Kuwaiti position.

From another standpoint, as is generally known the Iranian regime was assigned the job of being the area under imperialist control--or in other words, continuing to pump oil on the basis of economic stipulations which were compatible with the Western economies--and also of remaining an open market for foreign products, being a big importer of arms and exporting surplus capital to world markets.

As is well known, with the arming of Iran by America and America's setting up of the intelligence organization SAVAK, among other things, Iran began to carry out this role in an aggressive manner, as was evident in the occupation of the islands and the landing of forces in Oman, and subsequently in the claims which the shah made in order to secure some measure of acceptance for them--or if not acceptance, let us say acceptable political agreement from everyone. These were the claims which rested on his statement that he would intervene in the Gulf area to oppose any change which would disturb the balance then in existence, which favored imperialism and its servants in the area.

These claims evolved to the point where the shah said he would intervene even if no one called him, and then evolved even further to the point that they did not stop at the Gulf area or the Arab shore of the Gulf but extended to Yemen, Ethiopia and Somalia as well.

I believe that this picture of the Iranian regime threatened the area--threatened the national existence of the area, or the existence of the area's national identity--because the idea of the presence of force, and the idea of the uncharacter of the area, which exists amid reciprocal migrations between the Arab shore and the Iranian shore, to the extent that the Arab population has almost become a minority, as is the case in some areas of the Arab south--of course, this threatens the national identity of the area, threatens the aspirations of the peoples here to achieve democratic and economic progress.

This Iranian course became more clearly established when certain Arab regimes, led by the Sadat regime, were driven to deal with the shah's government, with complete silence from the Arab arena. This silence accompanied the occupation of the three islands, and it accompanied the landing of forces in Oman, as if the area had become completely open before the shah and his might supported by the United States.

All of us recall that the very same information media which beat the drum for the Iranian revolution had done so for the shah and had diminished the importance of the shah's occupation of the islands, saying that the islands were just a collection of stones in the sea.

The downfall of the shah in this manner eliminated the biggest obstacle in the area hindering the peoples of the area from setting out to break the grip of foreign control.

Also, in the Gulf area--and especially in Kuwait, Bahrain and other areas--there is a certain population make-up. There are various sects, Sunni and Shi'ite, as well as many citizens of Iranian origin. The shah and colonialism attempted to exploit these divisions--whether tribal, ethnic or sectarian--and to reinforce and deepen them in order to keep the communities disrupted from within so that they would lose the social harmony within themselves and consequently would prevent the internal forces from forming an axis around their basic issues and becoming united around the common problems which affected them and touched the lives of all of them, since because of this internal disruption such potential would become weak. However, with the downfall of the shah and the coming of the revolutionary regime in Iran--a regime opposed to colonialism, a regime which has popular orientations, and a regime which supports Arab issues, while the shah's was a regime which was hostile to Arab issues, one which was hostile toward 'Abd-al-Nasir, one which recognized Israel and supplied it with oil... Also, the shah's regime promoted a kind of chauvinism within Iran, marked also by the strengthening of the military organizations and whatever you select from the matter of the building of the military organizations.

The shah established within Iran the Iranian chauvinist national movement which had expansionist ambitions and aspirations to build a great state in the area which would control the other national groups and states. Another regime has taken the place of that one. Of course, with its emphasis on the Islamic bond and as a result of the fact that it is an Islamic regime, it has something in common with the peoples of the area. And it also has a popular orientation opposed to imperialist supremacy, and has nationalist policies, especially with regard to the oil question, beginning with the lowering of its oil production. Moreover, it has replaced what machinery the shah had to check the states' demands to raise oil prices. The regime in Iran has come to stand with the states demanding an increase in the price of oil as a means to regain the peoples' rights to their wealth. Thus, the nature and orientations of this regime--even though there may be some contradictions or some temporary difficulties--in the long run there is no doubt that this regime will help strengthen the movement for social, democratic and national progress in the Persian Gulf area, the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab region as a whole.

We cannot ignore the direct effect this has had on the groups which have sectarian sympathies, because most of the Iranian people are members of the Shi'ite sect.

There is also a bond of sympathy between the Shi'ite groups and the Iranian revolution, because it is also an Islamic revolution whose leadership and masses are primarily members of the Shi'ite sect. But this sympathy is now revolutionary in nature, while in the past the colonialist powers and the previous regime had taken advantage of the deepening of this matter and had tried to create insularity within the Gulf countries--and especially in Kuwait and Bahrain--between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites and between citizens with Arab origins and citizens with Iranian origins. Moreover, they had tried to put themselves in a position of guardianship over members of the Shi'ite sect and citizens with Iranian origins in order to create certain feelings of pride so that these groups would be directly and indirectly subordinate to them.

We found that many communities and many of the leaders made an effort to defend the regime of the shah. What the Iranian revolution has done indirectly is to help remove the internal barriers within the Gulf communities, open the doors to social cohesion and transcend the sectarian barriers to form a big national grouping made up of all the groups and sects of this area, which works to the advantage of the realization of popular demands, the granting of public freedoms, the achievement of democracy, the realization of economic and social progress and the fulfillment of the demand for justice in society. I believe that this is one of the central effects of the Iranian revolution which has truly upset the balance and the equations in the area in favor of the popular forces.

3. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mahmud, NLF-Bahrain

Without repeating what my brothers Sa'id Mas'ud and 'Abdallah have said, the Iranian revolution has had many effects on the area.

From the ally of Israel, Iran has been transformed into the ally of the Arab peoples, and especially the Palestinian people. Moreover, the elimination of the role of policeman in the Gulf area is not a trivial thing. Moreover, as an Islamic revolution in an area whose rulers claim to be interested in Islam and reliance on the Islamic religion, as Saudi Arabia does, the Iranian revolution has caused particular embarrassment for these rulers. At the same time, the Iranian revolution has shuffled the cards for imperialist schemes, both on the level of the Arab world and on the Gulf level. On the other hand, we believe that whatever negative changes may occur within Iran, we feel that from the military standpoint Iran will be frozen militarily in the wake of the revolution and will not play any role like that which it played during the days of the shah, and this is naturally to the advantage of the struggles of our peoples.

As Gulf forces, we met the revolution with open arms, especially since the revolution had a profound democratic and mass character and is a revolution which is marked by hostility to imperialism, and especially American imperialism, for the sake of regaining national resources and eliminating the dictatorial system, and for the sake of democracy--or in other words, a

revolution which has the same problems which in one form or another have been raised in the past and are still being raised by us as Gulf nationalist forces. All of us suffer from these problems in almost every state in the Gulf and the Peninsula, whether it be American imperialist hegemony or existing precepts or a democracy which means the loss of democratic freedoms.

From this standpoint, of course, we view the Iranian revolution with enthusiasm. But in order to avoid repeating the positive things which my brothers talked about, we will mention the other aspect, some of the trends and negative things which are occurring.

Imperialism, and especially American imperialism, has in the course of 30 years formed an organization like SAVAK which includes hundreds of thousands of individuals who are deeply embedded in many facets of social life. These individuals have tried to adapt to the new situation and penetrate even the committees of the revolution. They are attempting to change the course of the revolution and preoccupy it with matters other than the goals for which the revolution was carried out. This has undoubtedly had an effect on the Gulf in one way or another.

We recall the negative aspect which concerned us in Bahrain, namely, the irresponsible statements of some clergymen or nonclergymen, such as al-Ruhani, or certain officials. We consider these statements which lay claim to Bahrain to be negative factors which are not in the interests of the Iranian revolution or the Bahraini people. They have given the authorities, imperialism and reactionism in the area an opportunity not only to launch a campaign against the nationalist forces within Bahrain, but to launch a campaign of insult and confusion against the Iranian revolution itself, regardless of whether the statements came from people in authority or out of authority. Local reactionary elements have taken advantage of these statements to revive the "Gulf security" scheme under the guise and pretext of the new Iranian threat to the Arab identity of Bahrain.

We feel that the positive effect of the Iranian revolution will be stronger, as Ba'id said, when their internal problems are solved on the basis of the principles for which the revolution was carried out, which are the elimination of dictatorship, the strengthening of democratic life, the elimination of imperialist control over national resources and the extension of the hand of the revolution to the nationalist forces in the Gulf. This is the most important thing, especially since we in Bahrain believe that the solution to our problem in Bahrain lies in the unity of the nationalist forces on the basis of the proposed nationalist program, and that by relying on democracy and extending its hand to the nationalist forces in the Gulf, the Iranian revolution is putting itself on the right track.

4. Yahya al-Shami, YAR Democratic National Front

It can be stated plainly that the Iranian revolution has changed the balance of forces within the area. The downfall of the fascist military regime in

Iran means the downfall of one of the great strongholds subject to imperialism in the area.

With regard to its direct effect or influence on Yemen and North Yemen in particular, this is reflected in the fact that the anticipated threats against the Democratic National Movement in North Yemen and the democratic government in the south of the country no longer exist.

We recall that in 1976 the shah made the statement to the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-SIYASAH that he was ready to send forces to the north to strike at any unrest in this part of Yemen if Saudi Arabia did not play a role in this connection.

Moreover, Iran--the shah--proposed that one of his tasks was, of course, to resist the PDRY in an effort to confront the nationalist and democratic movements which existed in the Gulf and Peninsula areas in general, and in an effort to create the impression that the PDRY was the cause of these movements. Undoubtedly, the Iranian revolution's ability to solve the social problems and its ability to root out the remnants of the previous regime and its links with imperialism will provide a more ample opportunity for creative and revolutionary cooperation between the sides within the nationalist and democratic movement in the Gulf and the Peninsula and the Iranian revolution. There is also a direct effect from the moral standpoint which was recognized by the masses of our people in Yemen, namely, the power of the imperial regime in Iran and the fact that it fell before the peaceful explosions and revolutions of the people. This raised the moral spirit of the masses in North Yemen and thus strengthened their optimism about the future.

My assessment is that all of us in the Gulf and the Peninsula must search for the appropriate forms and means to provide a tangible link between the Iranian revolution and our democratic movements and organizations in the Gulf and the Peninsula.

The nationalist movement in the Gulf and the Peninsula and the Iranian revolution must immediately take the initiative to achieve such a link. Imperialism, reactionary elements and the remnants of the imperial regime in Iran have initiated a series of actions aimed at the Iranian revolution on the domestic plane and on the plane of the Iranian revolution's relationship with the peoples of the area. This is reflected in the statements which have been issued by some suspicious elements at the heart of the Iranian revolution--elements which we do not doubt at all are strongly linked with the previous regime, the former Iranian intelligence agency SAVAK and imperialist intelligence. This has been alluded to in statements made by individuals in the leadership of the Iranian revolution, in addition to and in confirmation of what the brothers who spoke before me brought out.

In addition to what has already been said, I have two remarks:

The first is that after the downfall of the shah's regime, we as nationalist and democratic forces in the Gulf and the Peninsula must realize that world imperialism under the leadership of the United States of America will intensify its support for Saudi reactionism so that the Saudis can assume an additional role which will make up for the loss that occurred with the outbreak of the Iranian revolution.

This matter must be taken into consideration.

My second remark confirms what some of my comrades have said about the existing relations among the nationalist sides in the Gulf and Peninsula area. These relations are good from the moral standpoint, but they are still weak. However, the source of this weakness lies in circumstances which relate to--or difficulties which hinder--our capability for movement and contact. We must bear in mind this difficulty, the source of which is the lack of the necessary and, in our view, possible unity among all the nationalist and democratic forces which exist separately in each of the various countries of the Gulf and the Peninsula. Therefore, to achieve a better relationship on the level of the Gulf and the Peninsula, it becomes necessary and imperative that the maximum tireless and diligent efforts be made to create stronger relations among the sides in every country within the framework of agreed-upon front action, i.e., an agreed-upon minimum framework. If these groupings had front forms, then our ability to make contact on the level of the Gulf and the Peninsula would be facilitated. We recall from practical experience a doubling of efforts, even on the level of mutual contacts among our organizations in various areas of the Gulf and the Peninsula. We must work with determination and earnestness, and we point especially and frankly to the importance of efforts on the part of the nationalist and democratic organizations in Bahrain.

Muqayn Musa, Popular Front-Bahrain

In addition to the fact that the Islamic revolution in Iran represents a change in the balance of forces in the area, it also adds another point pertaining to this matter. This point is that the Gulf security alliance in its previous form is no longer before us, since Iran was the military cornerstone and Saudi Arabia the political cornerstone of this security alliance, and the departure of the regime of the shah tore down one of the main pillars on which it rested. However, it is certain that the alliance will be reconsidered on the basis that it be an Arab security alliance. Also, a substitute in this area for the regional role which Iran had played will inevitably be sought, and I believe that the Sadat regime is now being put forward by the United States to play the role of substitute on the basis of the new accords. This is the American-Israeli-Egyptian alliance.

In addition to what has already been presented, the Islamic revolution in Iran has generated a climate similar to that generated by Nasirism, in the sense that it has spread an atmosphere of zeal among simple, ordinary men,

because the concept which the revolution in Iran has put forward is close to the mind of the citizen and close to the political consciousness in the region. The reactionary organizations or regimes cannot question this revolution, because it is a revolution which puts forward the principle of Islam, and the regimes in our area claim to be under the aegis of Islam. When a revolution comes in the name of Islam to change and sweep away a regime which is an agent of America and propose a new line--propose the need for change in the area--the regimes cannot oppose it directly. For this reason, we have seen the confusion in circles within the Gulf regimes vis-a-vis the revolution in Iran. They cannot withhold its news and its statements. They cannot blackout as they have done successfully in the past many of the revolutionary ideas and theories put forward.

This is one side of the matter. On the other side, the revolution has created a climate in which the ordinary citizen has begun to follow radio broadcasts, to follow the revolution and its developments and repercussions. The revolution has become the talk of the street, and we see its effect in the mentality of the ordinary citizen and in the outbreak of spontaneous demonstrations.

With respect to us in Bahrain, this was surprising, because from 1972 until the present not a single demonstration had broken out. Thus, the outbreak of a demonstration with thousands of people was a surprise. But it indicated the new morale and the new feeling among the people.

The revolution has kindled a new zeal among the people, and it has kindled conflicts. And the conflicts exist, certainly. It has made the people hate these regimes. Their sympathy for change in the area existed, but the revolution unveiled it. Thus, we observed the spontaneous movement of the people, which was an expression of their solidarity--not only their solidarity with the revolution in Iran and the Palestinian revolution, but they express local feelings, democratic feelings, feelings hostile to America, the elimination of American principles and the American presence.

Moreover, the revolution in Iran has put an important question before the clergymen: Is their responsibility just formal? Is the clergyman's mission just the religious observances and a life of piety? Or is the clergyman's responsibility to be at the center of the concerns of society, the rights of the people and the rights of the oppressed ordinary citizen whom he must represent?

This revolution has imposed choices on the clergyman. He can choose to be either on the side of the people or on the side of the rulers. This is really an important issue for us, because it has placed the nationalist movement in Bahrain in a confrontation with the Shi'ite religious movement. The government has succeeded in fabricating a struggle between the religious movement represented by the Religious Assembly and the nationalist movement through the death of the journalist 'Abdallah al-Madani. Under the pretext of the death of the journalist 'Abdallah al-Madani, who was one of the Shi'ite

religious leaders, a campaign was launched against the nationalist movement; two members of the movement, Sa'id al-'Uwaynati and Muhammad Bujiri, were killed; and there were arrests and a phase of repression.

Actually, the nationalist movement in Bahrain had not wanted this, and had been asserting that its battle was with imperialism and its military and economic presence and political control, and that its conflict was with reactionism. But the revolution in Iran put this question before the clergyman: What is your mission? Are you on the side of your people or are you on the side of the rulers and their propagandists?

A sorting process is now occurring in the religious movement. In Bahrain we find an effective religious movement, especially from the men of the second rank, who have no interests in the regime. They have sided with their people and the nationalist movement, and we now consider them within the nationalist ranks. There will remain a wing of the clergy which is on the side of the authorities--inside the structure of the regime.

The course of the revolution in Iran is not in our hands. Certainly, no revolution travels in a straight line. The revolution will inevitably take some twists and turns. We feel that despite all the negative things which accompany the revolution in Iran, we see its positive aspects in the fact that it has torn down the pillar of imperialism and has changed from a regime in the service of American imperialism to a regime which is the enemy of American imperialism, a friend of the Arab people and a supporter of their central cause, the cause of Palestine. To be sure, the success of the revolution in Iran lies in finding a solution for the difficulties it is facing. These are not difficulties which are found only in Iran, however, but difficulties which are present in all the underdeveloped states, including our country. For example, in Iran there is an Arab nationality alongside other nationalities, and they also exist in the Gulf. There have always been ties linking the Arabs, Ahvaz and the Arabs of the Gulf. Iran's success in solving the ethnic problem will provide an illustrious future for the revolutionary movement in the area. Its success in solving the problem of democracy, its success in solving the economic problem, an economic structure independent from the capitalist states--all of those things would help push forward the revolutionary movement in the area.

Also, the past policies of the shah have left some apprehensions among the Arab people in the area: the expansionist policy, the repression, the occupation of the islands, the threats of occupation, and so on.

While we feel that the liberation of this area is a duty which falls upon the people of the area, putting a final end to these apprehensions would play a role in boosting the nationalist and progressive movement in this area by depriving the regimes of a perennial justification for using foreign forces and allusions to the Iranian threat in confirming the American presence and in making use of a foreign presence, as Bahrain has now done by

bringing in Saudi forces. As is now proposed, this could develop into upsurging America into not confirming its presence in the area.

What is also sought is a final end to claims from individuals such as Rumani whose links are well known and who have expansionist aspirations.

Another issue can be brought out by the revolution in Iran. The revolution has put a challenge before the Arab regimes in general, namely, their obligation vis-a-vis the Palestinian cause, or their obligation vis-a-vis the Arab-Zionist-imperialist struggle. The revolution has taken practical measures including the matter of cutting off the oil and cutting off diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel. This puts a challenge before the Arab regimes and give us a pretext to say: "Be my guest! Iran, a non-Arab state, is taking measures which are more practical than yours."

What is now before us in Bahrain as a first step is the establishment of a democratic nationalist grouping. Because throughout the recent period, some forms of relations have been established among the nationalist forces, but they have not progressed to the establishment of an organization with clear relations and a clear program. We have raised the important matter of establishing a democratic nationalist grouping based on a minimum program which would bring together all the nationalist and democratic forces. Actually, we are guided by the experience of Kuwait, which we consider a model for us.

The other issue we raise is on the level of the Gulf and the Peninsula. Actually, all of us agree that the nationalist forces in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula share certain tasks, and that there are bonds which link the people of this area with one another. We feel that the present state of fragmentation is a temporary state and one which is not in the interests of the people of the area and is not in keeping with the aspirations of the people of the area. We believe that it is possible to reach a higher form of relations among the nationalist forces in the Gulf and the Peninsula than we have at present. What has been accomplished is good and excellent, but what is required from us is a model so that our struggle and the relations and organizational forms which we create are in keeping with the challenges before us.

6. 'Abd-al-Wakil al-Sururi, Yemeni Socialist Party

The matters which the seminar has touched on are based on the assumption that the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula area is one of the hot areas. The fact is that prior to the Iranian revolution the PDRY was in constant opposition to the agent regime in Iran. The PDRY was always on the side of the nationalist and democratic forces in Iran and in opposition to the policy and regime of the shah. From the first, the party, government and people of Yemen have been on the side of the Iranian revolution. We consider the Iranian revolution to be one of the important historic events of the modern era. By rights, the political and economic balances for the Arabs and the

world were upset. We believe that the Iranian revolution is still young, and that all of the nationalist and democratic forces must stand beside the Iranian revolution with the perseverance and determination of revolutionaries. Because ever since its victory over the regime of the shah, the Iranian revolution has proclaimed fundamentally and clearly its opposition to imperialism, reactionism and Zionism and has taken practical steps in this regard. The most prominent example of this is its unlimited support and unwavering position in favor of the Palestinian revolution under the leadership of the PLO, as well as its cutting off of oil sales to racist regimes such as those of South Africa and Israel. Moreover, we say that Iran is not detached from the difficulties which surround the Gulf and the Peninsula, and therefore we and the Iranian revolution are fighting in the same trench, our difficulties and problems are the same, and we must work together through democratic dialogs to solve and settle any breaches which occur.

8591

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

MOROCCO REFUSES SAHARAN CONCESSION--Paris, 4 Jan--Question: Relations with Algeria are constantly deteriorating because of the Sahara affair. How do you think this conflict could be solved? Answer: You must not think for a moment that such a deep-seated, crucial and emotional national issue could be solved by any Moroccan concession on the territorial level. We have advocated setting up a system of cooperation among the states in the region for the people's benefits. Outside that framework, I see no possibility of peace. [Excerpts] [LD140917 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 4 Jan 80 pp 1, 4 LD]

CSO: 4400

MINISTER OF INFORMATION DISCUSSES CURRENT ARAB AFFAIRS, IRAN

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 9 Dec 79 p 5

/Article by Fathi Sharif: "Algerian Minister of Culture and Information in a Talk with AL-SIYASAH: United Arab Political Willpower Does Not Now Seem Able To Provide Alternative to Arab-Israeli Struggle"/

/Text/ When he called me for an interview in the Kuwait Hilton Hotel last Thursday evening, a few hours after his arrival, I imagined that the talk between us, which began intensely but calmly, on everything concerning the Algerian revolution--its role, its position, its ideas, its stands on current Arab issues and the game of the international struggle over it--I imagined that after this beginning I would be able to record some observations on my talk with him.

However, the member of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front and the Algerian minister of information and culture, Abdel-hamid Mehri, urgently requested that my questions be written and specific so that he would be able to answer them precisely. I said, "But your excellency the minister, I do not have written questions with me because I let conversations take their course, while specifying certain important points, and because without a direct dialogue we will lose the element of dynamism, enthusiasm--and truth!"

The Algerian minister said, "I hope that you appreciate my position, and I will promise you that AL-SIYASAH will be the only paper I will talk to."

The minister responded to AL-SIYASAH's written questions and although he carried out his promise and gave AL-SIYASAH this exclusive interview, it was far removed from the language of direct dialogue and the enthusiasm of encounter also. Here you have the text of the discussion:

/Question/ The Arab citizen, Mr. minister, is now inquiring about revolutionary Algeria's role and participation in Arab national issues and problems. Many people consider that the Algerian revolution has reduced its role and has become isolated from other crises and causes. What is your opinion on these statements?

/Answer/ If the Arab citizen is inquiring about revolutionary Algeria's role, this is proof of the importance which all Arabs give to the development of the Algerian revolution, but to judge the extent to which the Algerian revolution has performed its role requires that one ascertain what the Arab citizen expects from this revolution. What the Arab citizen expects from the Algerian revolution is a kind of emotional attachment which we appreciate and cherish, but that might not take into consideration the objective resources available, and what the Arab citizen expects from the Algerian revolution might arise from circumstances conditioned by time or place which do not take stock of the national dimension, which is the only context in which the role of any Arab country can be carried out.

The question as to whether Algeria has become isolated from other crises and issues requires some clarification. What crises and what issues has Algeria been remote from? Algeria's remoteness from some crises might be positive in the general national view and its remoteness from some other crises might just be an impression because its role in them has not been visible, owing to its preference to act free from publicity.

Algeria has been and still is present in the major issues and events which the Arab citizen has become familiar with. It performed its role in the two wars the Arab nation embarked on in 1967 and 1973 and it was present in the Arab nation's struggle to regain its natural resources, in particular its oil resources. It has been and still is on the side of the Palestinian people in their many-sided struggle against imperialism and Zionism, it was present with its brother Arabs in the struggles to demand a new international economic order, and it was present at the dialogue between north and south, the Arab-European dialogue, and the Arab-African dialogue. The effort to establish Arab-African solidarity made Israel feel great isolation on this important continent. Algeria was present in the struggle of perseverance and counteraction against the Camp David agreements and their evil effects on the Arab nation.

In all these positions, Algeria proceeded from a deep and conscious faith in the unity of Arab destiny, which places the general national interest above the interest of the country.

Perhaps the impression which the Arab citizen has acquired on the reduction of the role of the Algerian revolution results from deficiencies in the media in the Maghreb and the Arab East in informing the Arab reader about what is going on in and issuing from Algeria.

/Question/ It seems that the Western Sahara issue has become the main pre-occupation of the Algerian revolution. What is your evaluation of the Western Sahara issue among other issues? Would it be possible to give us an idea of the essence and the dimensions of the Sahara issue?

/Answer/ As far as Algeria and the entire Maghreb area go, the issue of the Western Sahara is an important one, but it is not the sole

preoccupation of the Algerian revolution. There are many liberation causes in Africa and Asia which have enjoyed and always do enjoy great interest on the part of the Algerian revolution.

However, the Western Sahara lies on Algeria's boundaries and it is natural that interest in it should be great. If as far as Algeria goes it represents a cause of national liberation and liquidation of imperialism, the essence of the problem is not manifest in some sectors of Arab public opinion.

The problem of the Western Sahara today and the problem of the establishment of the state of Mauritania yesterday arise from Morocco's demand to revert to what it considers its historic boundaries and its refusal to recognize the international boundaries which existed at independence. This is what is causing Morocco to differ not just with Algeria but also with the group of African states, whose charter of unity stipulates that borders which existed at independence must be honored. Morocco in fact might be differing with all Arab countries, which were established in accordance with borders of this kind. We can imagine the chaos and the dangers which Africa and the Arab world will face if every country opens the file on its historic borders.

/Question/ What are the possible resolutions to the Western Sahara crisis and what is your view on what is being stated to the effect that war could flare up at any time if the arbitrators' council meeting fails--as it is in fact about to?

/Answer/ Algeria has no special resolution to recommend for resolving the Western Sahara issue. Rather, it is content with the resolution which was the subject of agreement among Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania before Morocco invaded the Western Sahara, that of enabling the people of the Sahara to exercise their rights to determine their destiny. If the Organization of African Unity, the Nonaligned Conference and recently the United Nations General Assembly have approved this resolution, it is because they know, through official published documents, that this resolution always was the object of agreement at the summit conferences where the heads of the three countries of Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania met. It is this resolution whose application the arbitrators' council which was formed by the Monrovia Conference called for its latest meeting when it requested Morocco to withdraw its forces from the whole Western Sahara, including the section Mauritania relinquished.

As regards the possibility that the scope of the conflict may be expanded, this will never be at the initiative of Algeria, which is carefully and resolutely committed to the defense of its borders only.

/Question/ Do you believe that the Sahara crisis might end up being internationalized? Is there a likelihood that a summit meeting could soon be held between President Bendjedid and King Hasan? What are the bounds of Arab mediation which is still taking place up to now?

/Answer/ Attempts are being made to give the Western Sahara issue an international coating in which some major powers will find an opportunity to defend their interests, which are certainly not Morocco's interests, although defense of Morocco's interests will be taken as a facade for them. My belief is that internationalization or non-internationalization of the Sahara issue will depend on the Moroccan leaders' estimate of the situations and events which the Arab region in general and the Maghreb in particular are experiencing.

If a meeting has not taken place between King Hasan II and President Chadli Bendjedid, that is because it has always been placed in an erroneous context aimed at convincing public opinion that the Western Sahara issue is just a dispute between Algeria and Morocco over the division of territorial or economic booty. If limited Arab mediation has not been crowned with success, that is because the Moroccan leaders for their part are placing it in this context. This mediation could enjoy more success if it took place in a framework which took stock of the objective facts of the Western Sahara issue.

/Question/ What is Algeria's evaluation of the course of joint Arab action now, in the light of the conclusions of the Tunis summit conference meetings? Why didn't President Chadli Bendjedid take part in these meetings?

/Answer/ Joint Arab action now represents the limits which have been agreed upon by Arab countries; in Algeria's view (which might correspond to that of other Arab countries), this represents mental effort. Algeria, by the nature of the case, wishes Arab efforts to concur at higher, more comprehensive levels of action and it is striving, within the limits of its resources, in isolation or in solidarity with other Arab parties, to exert more effort to face the challenges and dangers the Arab nation is facing.

President Chadli Bendjedid's failure to attend the recent Arab summit conference naturally has none of the significance which the Western media have attributed to it.

/Question/ Do you believe that the Arabs are capable of coming up with a formula or an alternative to solve the crisis of the Arab-Israeli struggle, Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories, and establishment of a Palestinian state?

/Answer/ If capability means material and human resources and the resources of political and diplomatic action, then the capability exists. If it means united Arab political will, then this capability does not now seem present. One cannot rule out that the development of events will work to make it present in the future.

/Question/ How do you now evaluate the political role of the Palestinian revolution? Do you support the establishment of a Palestinian-American-European dialogue, or do you have some other position?

/Answer/ I believe that an evaluation of the role of the Palestinian revolution must comprehend all aspects of the revolution if it is to approach the truth. To restrict oneself to evaluating political action aspects alone may not lead to a clear conception. The role of the Palestinian revolution, which has rejected capitulationist solutions and is continuing the struggle against the occupier on all fronts, is a positive one on the general Arab level and the strategic course of this revolution's progress must be included within this general Arab conception. As for details on practical plans, I believe that it is difficult to discuss these at this level.

/Question/ What are Algeria's relations now with:

France, now that it has been bruited about that there are disputes between the two countries;

The United States of America;

And the Soviet Union?

/Answer/ Our relations with other countries are founded on the principles of the nonaligned movement, to which we belong, on our desire for national independence in its comprehensive sense, on the establishment of reciprocity in various fields on a basis of interest, and on the determination of points of concurrence in supporting the causes of freedom and justice in the world, foremost among them naturally the causes of the Arab nation.

As regards Algerian French relations, we would hope that they would be founded on these very principles at least if we cannot bring them to the level of broader and deeper cooperation.

/Question/ What is Algeria's position now on the Islamic revolution in Iran? Do you expect that this revolution will be compatible with Arab thoughts and philosophy in the future?

/Answer/ Algeria considers the Islamic revolution in Iran to be a positive event in the region because it is rectifying the balance of forces, which had been disrupted to the benefit of the Zionist occupation following the Camp David agreements. It believes that there are numerous points of agreement between the Arabs and the Iranian revolution and that it is necessary for the Arabs and Iran both, on their parts, to try to confine the negative features which have appeared or will appear in the future in the relations between them, to create formulations which will guarantee that the Arabs and Iran will join together in one front as far as the Palestinian Arab cause goes, and to move Arab-Iranian relations to the field of fruitful cooperation based on friendship and mutual respect.

/Question/ Do you anticipate a war between the United States and Iran in the light of the aggravated crisis over the American embassy in Tehran?

/Answer/ I believe that there are early signs of hope for eliminating this sort of danger, through negotiations and the resolution of problems by peaceful means far removed from any pressure; since we believe that the roots of the crisis between Iran and America transcend the issue of the embassy, the events of modern history teach us that the great powers can also commit great mistakes.

/Question/ What is Algeria's anticipated position regarding the next OPEC organization ministers' council meetings? Will Algeria request a gradual increase in oil prices, thereby coordinating itself with the position of some Gulf countries?

/Answer/ In its oil policy, Algeria always aims at a policy of consultation and adoption of resolutions within the context of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, because it believes that this context represents the most successful means for united action. If Algeria has some ideas on issues set forth at this organization's next meeting, it will present them in this context.

11887

CSO: 4402

BAHRAIN NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT REPORTS ON DOMESTIC SITUATION

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 14 Nov 79 p 3

[Article: "Bahrain National Liberation Front's Report on Domestic Situation; Special Characteristic of Bahrain Situation Requires Struggle That Is Responsibility of Bahrain National Movement Alone"]

[Text] Effect of Iranian Revolution on Gulf States

An important revolutionary event such as the valiant popular revolution in Iran cannot but leave its important effects on the course of events in our country and in the Gulf area. The victory of the Iranian people's revolution has dealt a strong slap to the face of imperialism, particularly the U.S. imperialism, which had turned Iran into an enormous arsenal of the latest weapons and into a strong arm of imperialism performing the role of the policeman repressing the struggles and uprisings of the area's peoples and nurturing the shah's chauvinist expansionist inclinations. Iran is no longer a stage for U.S. monitoring and intelligence activity. Moreover, the Iranian national leadership's decision to withdraw from the CENTO has caused a crack in this alliance and, thus, one of the most hated legacies of the cold war has come to end.

The big slogans that united the Iranian opposition forces are the same slogans for which our peoples in the Gulf are struggling. Therefore, it has been natural for the Iranian revolution's victory to ignite our peoples' enthusiasm, to revive their determination and resolution and to raise their morale now that they have become confident, as a result of the tangible reality, that the night of terror, torture and oppression must come to end, regardless of how long it is. The opposite has happened to the reactionary regimes that are isolated from their peoples and that are protected with the bayonets, bases and monopolies of the Americans in this part of the world. The Iranian revolution has aroused horror, fear and confusion in the hearts of these regimes.

This is why we have received the Iranian revolution with broad support and why we have viewed its victory as a great event that will have a deep impact on the future situation in our country. We have warned the government from the outset against efforts to contain the positive effects and

have urged the people's masses to get prepared for a new phase of our struggle for democracy.

Relationship of Iranian Revolution With What Has Happened in Our Country and With Domestic Situation

Bahrain is experiencing a stifling political, economic and social crisis. The masses' living problems are very intense and the crises of high costs of living, housing and low wages are escalating. There is broad popular resentment and complaint against the government's policies and programs. Moreover, the state of terror, repression and the oppression of liberties has reached an unbearable point. The issue of the political detainees has become an urgent issue, considering that these detainees have spent long years in jail without trial and that they have remained in detention the maximum period stipulated by the terroristic state security law (3 years). The question of releasing these detainees has become a popular demand that receives broad popular support. Broader and broader sectors of the masses have come to realize that a return to parliamentary life and the release of the democratic liberties is the only means to rescue the country from the dilemma in which it has been floundering since the reactionary campaign of 23 August 1975. Under this situation prepared objectively for a move, the Iranian revolution came as a big moral boost and the working class has been moving since the beginning of the revolution's triumph through a series of appeals, memorandums and demands emanating from various labor positions. The National Federation of Bahrain Students, a popular institution that is tantamount to a student coalition of all the national forces [sic], has also escalated its struggle to topple the tyrannical decisions adopted against the student movement, decisions including the one banning more than 200 students from leaving the country to resume their college studies.

A new factor has also entered the situation. The presence of a religious leadership at the head of the Iranian revolution has motivated some religious sectors to move as of the beginning of this summer under various religious slogans, some of which are not totally free of the sectarian breath, such as the demand that the children of each sect be taught the principles of their religious sect, as well as the demand calling for banning musical education in school and the demand for banning coeducation.

These religious sectors have also adopted some general national slogans, such as those calling for reconsidering the state security law and for releasing the detainees. But these sectors have continued to take a cautious position toward the national movement and have not expressed any considerable readiness for cooperating with it because Imam Khomeyni's (call) has raised such slogans as: No to communism.

Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that the statements of some religious Iranian leaders, especially Ayatollah Rohani's repeated statements about the Iranian intention to annex Bahrain to Iran, Rohani's claim that the Bahraini people have authorized him to speak in their name, his claim that

he will lead the forthcoming religious revolution in Bahrain and other such statements that we condemn and reject in part and parcel--it cannot be ignored that these statements have cast some suspicions on these movements and have given the reactionary authorities a strong pretext to antagonize the Iranian revolution and to prepare for a religious sedition, taking advantage of the fact that these religious moves have only been made by the Shi'ite clergymen so far and that the Sunni clergymen take a cautious, even hostile, position toward these moves.

The Liberation Front is eager to reaffirm the Arabism of Bahrain and to underline its rejection of all the suspect allegations seeking to erase this Arab affiliation and speaking about our country as being a part of Iran. The Arabism of our country is a historical fact which we will defend and which we will not relinquish. Moreover, our people do not need anybody to shackle [sic] their struggle. Our national movement is the only side concerned with this task and it is not the business of anybody else, especially if he is from outside Bahrain, to claim for himself this right.

Particular Characteristic of Bahrain

We are also eager to underline the particular characteristic of the Bahrain situation and the fact that it is different from the Iranian situation in some respects. We are eager, consequently, to underline the error of the approaches that imagine that what has happened in Iran must happen in Bahrain, and with the same details. The sectarian structure of Bahrain is not the same as that of Iran. Bahrain's population is almost equally divided into Sunnis and Shi'ites whereas the overwhelming majority in Iran is Shi'ite. This is why the movement there has assumed the form of a general Islamic, and not a purely sectarian, movement. But if the religious movement in our country continues to be confined to the Shi'ite clergymen, then the dangers of this movement assuming a sectarian character and turning at a later stage into an essentially sectarian movement are serious dangers.

In Iran, the religious movement did not assume a leadership position in the revolution until it raised clear and definite democratic slogans and avoided focusing on the sectarian demands. Meanwhile, the religious movement in our country has started its activities with religious slogans that are predominantly sectarian in character. It must be noted that the religious movement opposed to the government [did not begin] until a few months ago, i.e. until after the Iranian revolution's victory, and that it does not have a prior history of struggle like that of the religious movement in Iran. Rather, the religious movement in our country has had strong relations with the government historically. Therefore, it does not have a revolutionary asset similar to that of the national movement. We are not saying here that the religious movement cannot accumulate such an asset in the future.

The leadership of our people's struggle has relied throughout tens of years and continues to rely on the national movement which represents the interests of the overwhelming majority of the toilers, the intellectuals and the small and middle bourgeoisie from both Islamic sects.

Truth of Situation and Struggle for Democratic Demands

For long years, our people and their national forces have not known the taste of democracy, unless we exclude the short period which the National Council (parliament) was destined to live. Since the arrival of Al Khalifah [ruling family], our country's history has been a history of plundering, persecution, exploitation and suppression of public liberties.

After Bahrain achieved its independence in 1971 in the wake of the British withdrawal from east of the Suez Canal and of the termination of the Iranian demands for Bahrain in the shah's era, the Liberation Front's diagnosis was that democratic liberties constituted the central link in our people's struggle in the current phase. This is why the front called for escalating the struggle for the release of public liberties, for a parliament elected by the people and for labor and professional unions. Our participation in the National Council elections embodied this direction. The crushing victory scored by the people's bloc that we supported and the commendable role that this bloc played inside the council to expose the government's policy and to defend the people's interests and rights are well known.

Now that the religious masses have begun the battle against the government, we cannot but welcome any additional voice opposing the government and its policy and prepared to struggle for our people's democratic goals and for social progress. To prevent the government and the Americans from diverting the struggle from its true goals and its right path, we call for uniting the demands and concentrating them in the following points: Restoring parliamentary life, releasing the political detainees and prisoners, releasing the public liberties and abolishing all the laws, decrees and measures shackling the public liberties, especially the state security law, and liquidating the U.S. military presence in the country.

The current situation in our country is extremely tense. The government has suppressed the religious demonstrations brutally and has arrested more citizens, some of whom are still in jails. The country is under conditions that are very close to a state of emergencies. Riot control squads and police patrols roam the country and the streets of the capital and the Saudi troops that have been sent to the country form a reserve force prepared to suppress any new movement.

The unity of the national force and its agreement on a minimum-limit program and the escalating struggle of our masses will force the government to capitulate to the immediate demands of the national movement. This minimum-limit program will bolster the struggle solidarity of the national forces and will make it possible to entrench and strengthen these gains.

Regarding National Unity

We have already presented our position toward the issue of establishing the broadest national democratic alliance--an alliance meeting on the basis of a minimum-limit program. This was done in our national action program

which we presented almost a year ago to all the national forces and figures in our country having an interest in the struggle for democracy, for curtailing the domination of the monopolies and for following an independent foreign policy.

It is our belief that this comprehensive plan is fit as a base for a dialogue between us and all the nationalists and democrats opposed to the government in our country--a dialogue aimed at reaching a suitable organizational form for common action.

The developments that have been and are being witnessed by our country must form an incentive for all concerned to overcome quickly all the difficulties and sensitivities obstructing the common national action with its broad spheres.

We still say, perhaps more persistently than ever before, that there is a lot over which we can agree. The points of disagreement among us should not constitute a justification for our not agreeing over that which we are already in agreement.

However, we believe that it is not at all possible to establish a broad national alliance in the absence of the minimum initial coordination among the fundamental progressive forces. These forces in particular are the ones that will form the axis or pivot of any national alliance of the kind--an alliance that attracts the other sectors and groups that approve the program agreed upon.

Regarding Gulf Security Plan

The Gulf security plan is a neo-old imperialist and reactionary plan. It is as old as the days of the dethroned shah when he was ruling with the force of the military and economic power that he possessed and when he was playing the fundamental role in preparing for a military and security treaty among the Gulf countries with the aim of besieging the popular movements in the area and of posing a threat to the progressive regime of the PDRY. The need for this treaty became more urgent after the revolutionary developments in Ethiopia and the talk about this treaty was coupled at the time with the talk about a Red Sea security plan.

In the period when the Iranian revolution was aflame and when the shah was a hair's breadth from falling, an active call was raised for a meeting of the Gulf rulers, without Iran, to study the means to take precautions against the flames of the Iranian revolution that could extend to their countries.

The plan is also new because when the shah fell and Bahrain and other countries of the area started to experience widespread activities heralding a development in these countries, this call [for a Gulf security treaty] was revived anew, and more seriously this time, to speed up the creation of an alliance of this kind to realize the well-known and suspect goals.

The statements of Rohani and of some rightist circles in Iran flow into the mill of these activities because they provide a sufficient cover for this movement that seeks to bring about this military treaty which will constitute a serious obstacle in the face of our peoples' struggles.

One of the suspect formulas being advocated for preserving the Gulf security is the one that is proposed by Qabus [sultan of Oman] and that gives the United States and the European countries the right to violate our area's territorial waters on the pretext of protecting the Strait of Hormuz by the countries that use this strait. Qabus, this agent who has sold his country to the Americans and the British, wants to give the imperialist presence in the area the quality of a "legitimate presence" so as to protect his rule with American bayonets from the escalating struggle led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.

The announcement on the dispatch of Saudi forces to Bahrain and the offers made here and there to send forces to our country on the pretext of defending Bahrain are an example of what services this alliance [treaty] can offer the imperialist and reactionary plans in the area.

It is our assessment that Saudi Arabia may exploit this situation and turn Bahrain into its permanent military base. We demand that the Saudi forces be withdrawn from our country and we condemn all the offers and forms of intervention being presented to the Bahrain authorities by the various reactionary states.

We also condemn the suspect endeavors to bring the Gulf security alliance into existence and condemn the recent forms of military cooperation among the Gulf countries, as well as the Qabus plan, because they are plans aimed against our peoples' struggle and serving the plans of the imperialist and reactionary circles in the area.

Al-Sadat's Statements and Aid

The statements of al-Sadat regime on its readiness to send forces to Bahrain to assist it in the face of the Iranian danger, as this regime claims, cannot be taken lightly. Al-Sadat is seeking rehabilitation through these offers, now that he has been isolated at the Arab level. He is also seeking a role in the Gulf. This offer is in harmony with al-Sadat's dispatch of his forces to replace the Iranian forces withdrawn from Oman.

Moreover, al-Sadat is maneuvering to shake the minimum-limit [resolutions] reached by the Baghdad summit with his attempt to lure reactionary circles which participated in that summit, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, to support him in return for his readiness to serve them.

We take the Egyptian statements seriously and stress the need for struggle against any form of Egyptian military intervention in our country.

Our peoples and their national forces do not stand alone. The Arab national liberation movement, of which we constitute a part, all the freedom and peace-loving peoples, especially the socialist organization and its vanguard--the Soviet Union--will give us support and backing. We are confident of a bright and luminous morrow which will shine on the Gulf when our peoples will have the say.

From AL-HURRIYAD

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BAHRAIN FINANCE TAKES OVER BEIRUT ROLE

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19-25 Nov 79 pp 39-40

[Article by Rashid al-Rashid: "Comparison Between Banking Systems in Bahrain and Lebanon; Bahrain Currency Market Surpasses Beirut Market; Lebanese Banks Move Abroad; Surpluses Invested at Loss"]

[Text] Perhaps one of the most important, and most indicative, new economic phenomena is this fast development of the Bahrain banking system and the nature and goals of this development. A little has been written on this topic, even though this phenomenon reflects a negative and attritive trend that undermines the Arab monies, or the so-called "petro-dollars." Numerous warnings have been voiced on maintaining the Arab funds in Europe and the United States. But this matter is still easy, it even turns into a result, compared to the re-formation of our internal economic structures on the hands of the international monopolies.

Before 1973, Bahrain had no noteworthy banking or financial importance. Bahrain produces no significant amount of oil, its refinery lives on Saudi oil and its resources are as small as its population. This is why before 1973 Bahrain did not even think of setting up a central bank. The oldest bank still in operation is the Bahrain National Bank which dates back to 1957 only and which was set up with a capital of just 1 million Bahraini dinars.

What happened after 1973 for Bahrain to assume this importance and to become the central point of attraction for the major world financiers? The answer is well-known. The adjustment of oil prices diminished a little the profits and revenues of the rich countries and the dollars accumulated by the oil exporting countries have had to go back to their sources. This is what is known as recycling "the surpluses." We know that the major part of these dollars belongs to the Gulf oil exporting countries. These countries are basically saturated insofar as their consumption is concerned. Within the existing equations, these countries find no spheres for the investment of their revenues, thus causing their foreign assets to rise to 97 percent of the OPEC's total foreign assets. Consequently, the foreign assets of Kuwait, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE rose from 5.4 billion dollars in 1972 to 98 billion in 1978.

So, there are billions of dollars in the Gulf and this is the reason for setting up the most advanced banking system in Bahrain. The direction is intentional and the option is premeditated, as we shall see. The monopolies have pursued and will continue to pursue these funds the way a cat chases a piece of fat. If the monopolies cannot acquire these funds through the door, then they will try to get them through the window. This is an evident example that again discards those capitalist definitions given for economic backwardness, including the weakness of the banking system and the weakness of the financial markets. The example of Bahrain proves indisputably that the imperialist interests are the cause of the weakness and fragmentation of the markets that these interests do not need and that we do need and of the vigor and progress of the markets that these imperialist interests need and that we do not need.

Suddenly in 1973, the law establishing the central bank under the name of the Bahrain Currency Establishment was promulgated. Within few years, the banking system develops to reach the level of the most advanced international banking systems. The number of current banks is estimated at 110 banks, i.e. a bank for every 2,800 citizens, and the banking system enjoys a flexibility and facilities unequalled in the world. This is reflected by the creation of free offshore zones that deal only in foreign currencies, especially the dollar (i.e. the petro-dollar) which constitutes 70 percent of the total non-Bahraini currencies in circulation. These markets [zones] enjoy full tax exemptions, the absence of any form of control over foreign transactions and the absence of all requirements for monetary reserves so that these banks operating in the free zones may be able to bring money into Bahrain and move it out of it to the international financial centers with utter freedom. The number of active banks completely specialized in this type of operations is 54 banks that engage in operations with which the Bahraini citizens have nothing to do. Their operations are confined to the "outside world" of the Gulf and the "outside world" of the financial centers. Added to these banks is the major number of the other banks that engage in the operations of the offshore banking units, in addition to their other banking activities. All that is required to set up an operational banking unit is to pay a fee of 20,000 dollars. The meagerness of this sum is exposed by the volume of the current transactions. The 1978 assets of 42 banks in the free zone were estimated at 23.4 billion dollars, a sum representing fourfold the assets accumulated in the area in 1976. The rise in the assets did not stop until 1979, thus compelling the Bahrain Currency Establishment to stop issuing new licenses because the market became saturated, according to what the establishment has said. Despite this, the reason may have been the relative decline in the value of the assets as a result of the relative stability of the oil prices throughout 1978. This is why it is said that the establishment recently approved licenses for the branches of three foreign banks and for a number of offices of the Japanese Banking Consortium out of its obvious eagerness that all the international interests be represented in this market.

Comparing this situation with the most advanced banking center in the Arab homeland, namely Lebanon, will demonstrate the importance of this leap or this push that has been realized by the Bahrain banking system.

Lebanese Banks

The number of banks in Lebanon at present is 79 banks, to which 38 representative offices are added. This figure is close to the number of current banks in Bahrain, as we have already seen. The only difference is that this Lebanese banking system has been built over 50 years whereas building the Bahrain banking system has not taken more than 5 years. Besides, the events of the Lebanese war compelled a number of Lebanese banks to move their centers of activity to where their clients have immigrated, i.e. to Europe. Consequently, 13 Lebanese banks have opened branch offices in Europe and the total deposits in these branches have amounted to 6 billion Lebanese pounds, i.e. one half the total deposits in Lebanon. In other words, these banks have either followed their clients or have returned to their positions. Thus, the catastrophes of some people have turned into the blessings of others. Perhaps what is more important than all this is that the assets of the commercial banks in Lebanon did not exceed in September 1978 the sum of 18,129,000,000 pounds, i.e. four times less than the assets of the banks operating in the Bahrain free market, and so forth.

Why Bahrain?

A quick glance at the banking and economic, and even political, structures in each of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE is guaranteed to provide the full answer to this question.

The Kuwait financial system bans the operation of non-Kuwaiti banks [sic] and this eliminates any possibility of performing this role, i.e. the role of a petro-dollar accumulation center before the departure of these dollars to the outside world. As for Saudi Arabia, it suffers from the inadequacy of its banking system and from the inflexibility of its structure and its modes of operation in this regard. This lets the real option stand between the UAE and Bahrain. A rivalry did actually arise between the two countries--a rivalry that is still present--even though Bahrain scored the victory because of the following factors:

1. Bahrain enjoys excellent relations with the other Gulf states. It is the pampered son, especially of Saudi Arabia which is the biggest owner of "surplus" monies. There are no border or political problems between Bahrain and any Gulf state connected with the petro-dollars.
2. The UAE is still suffering from the disunity [tamaful, a word which does not exist in the Arabic language] of its emirates. There are organizational and political problems for which no solutions have been found yet. Despite the presence of the system of (banks with restricted licensing) which represent free operation zones--offshore operations--and despite the

development of these zones, other factors recently motivated the UAE to close the door in the face of establishing more banks. The UAE's motives, according to the UAE, are to encourage national participation in the banking sector and to stop the enormous increase in the number of banks in a small country with vast oil resources.

3. The Government of Bahrain has devoted special attention to setting up and developing the free zones, considering that this will constitute the main source [of income] for the country.

4. In accordance with article 56 of the Bahrain Currency Establishment Law, Bahrain exempts the foreign establishments from the requirement of being joint-stock companies. This requirement is applied to the Bahraini citizens who wish to operate in the banking field. This exemption facilitates matters greatly for the foreign banks because all they have to do in this case is pay the foundation costs which do not exceed 25,000 dollars, as we have already pointed out. Meanwhile, the UAE law does not state this exemption frankly. Rather, the context of paragraph A of article 30 requires implicitly that an individual operating in the banking sphere have the status of company when the paragraph says: "While taking cognizance of the stipulations of article 2, any company wishing to engage in banking operations in the UAE..." In any case, the current situation proves that Bahrain was chosen originally as the meeting point of the international monopolies. It is the station in which all the petrodollars gather on their way to London, Paris, New York, Frankfurt, Zurich, Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo.

A quick glance at the Bahraini banks will demonstrate what positions the foreign wolves occupy in this system. In the Central Bank, where the financial secrets and the supreme policy are found, (Allan Moore) holds the position of the first adviser. Two of the five commercial banks in operation have foreign financial participation. The managers of four of these five banks are foreigners. Foreigners occupy the chair of chairman of the board of directors in three out of the five banks, not to mention the membership of the boards of directors of which only one board has no foreigners.

In addition to the commercial banks, there are the branch offices of the joint Arab-foreign banks, such as the Arab-European Bank and the union of Arab-French banks. Then come the branch offices and representative offices of the foreign banks, totaling in number 54 establishments which include the major international banks, such as the Chase-Manhattan Bank, the Bank of America, City Bank and so forth. The fact that this large number of major banks have turned to Bahrain is in itself an indication of the importance of the issue. The cat, as we have already said, chases the piece of fat and the piece of fat is big, very big, here. To realize how enormous is the issue, it is enough for us to review the totals of some "Gulf" loans during last August and September:

A total of 1,384,500,000 U.S. dollars.
 A total of 40 million Canadian dollars.
 A total of 31,640,000 French francs.
 A total of 2.65 million Egyptian pounds.
 A total of 53 million Kuwaiti dinars.
 A total of 25 million pounds Sterling.
 A total of 250 million Deutschemarks.
 A total of 575 million Saudi riyals.

These are enormous examples of the monies that can be acquired through loans alone, not to mention the various joint projects and investments. The cost of the petro-dollars is very low. A study published by the First National Bank of Chicago shows that the profits made on the investment of the foreign assets of the four Gulf countries mentioned below amounted to 7,448,800,000 dollars in 1977 compared to 583 million dollars in 1972, as demonstrated in the following chart:

Foreign Assets and Profits Realized 1972-1977
 In Millions of Dollars

1972

	<u>Foreign Assets</u>	<u>Profits</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Kuwait	2,418	410	
Qatar	414	28	
Saudi Arabia	2,303	125	
UAE	300	20	
Total	5,435	583	10.73

1977

	<u>Foreign Assets</u>	<u>Profits</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Kuwait	22,000	2,111	
Qatar	2,562	157.8	
Saudi Arabia	66,000	4,447	
UAE	7,570	731	
Total	98,132	7,448.8	7.59

It is thus evident that the interest rate dropped from 10.7 percent in 1972 to nearly 7.6 in 1977. This percentage, which constitutes a cost to the borrower, is much smaller than what the capital borrowed in the European markets and others yields. Moreover, this percentage is much lower than the inflation rates that erode the value of the dollar. This ultimately means that these profits constitute for us an outwardly profit and an actual loss, contrary to what they show on the other side--namely an outwardly loss and an actual profit.

A profound study of the Bahraini banking system and observation of this system's indicators will reveal the real directions of the petro-dollars and of the movement of the monopolies toward these dollars. Furthermore, this system is an important indicator of numerous local and international economic facts. The decline of the number of dollars in comparison to the total assets in the Bahrain free zones from 70 percent to 63 percent last May, for example, and the expanding influence of the Saudi riyal and of the Kuwaiti dinar and their intensifying role in the Euro-market are an indicator of the position of the dollar in the wake of its successive crises and of the increased speculation role of wealthy Arabs in the international financial markets. An example of this is that the bond issues in Kuwaiti dinars have amounted to 56 issues valued at 1.5 billion dollars and that the Kuwaiti establishments have offered 11 (issues), valued at 500 million dollars, to foreign borrowers.

The Bahraini banking system is a point where all the contradictions are exposed. From now on, this system is the indicator for first-rate economic and political facts.

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MEANS TO CONFRONT ZIONIST PROPAGANDA PRESCRIBED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic 14 Dec 79 [Nov Issue] p 26

[Article by Dr Muhyi-al-Din al-Alwa'i: "How Do We Confront World Zionism?"]

[Text] Since its foundation as a political and intellectual movement, the goal of Zionism has been to seek to gain resolutely and ceaselessly sympathy for the Jews so as to squeeze the world Jewry in the land that the Jews have usurped from the people of the Arab Palestine, to enlarge the area of this land after completely ridding it of its native inhabitants and to attribute the quality of nationalism to groups of people who scattered in numerous homelands more than 2,000 years ago and who have always lived in total isolation, clinging to their religious, cultural and social customs that keep them from merging with other peoples for no reasons other than deception and trickery.

Since the end of the last war [World War II], Zionism has been launching its psychological and intellectual campaigns with well-studied planning. Zionism first introduced into the markets war films, shot by the secret hands working for Zionism, about the Nazi acts against the Jews. Zionism had been confident that the road would be paved for it after the war to sneak into the conscience of the Europeans by charging their feelings with a sense of guilt and shame for what the Europeans had committed against the Jews. Zionism had also been confident that the Zionist information media would be then able to exert constant, relentless and ruthless efforts to intensify the traces of this European persecution of the Jews so that when feelings succumbed to this propaganda, Zionism would start sneaking gradually into the souls and the minds.

Plot and Goal

Their [Zionists'] sole goal behind this plot was to justify their immigration to Palestine and their emigration from Europe and to implant in the conscience of the European man the Jews' right to stability and reassurance in the young State of Israel, as if this state were the compensation for the persecution and torture that the Europeans committed against the Jewish people.

The new means to which the Zionists have resorted to achieve their goals is their endeavors to erase completely from the minds any question regarding the fate of the original Palestinian Arab people on whose land the State of Israel has been set up after the original people had been driven out of this land through deception, persecution and tyranny.

To eliminate this question from the minds, the Zionist campaigns resort to two main courses:

The first is to claim that the Palestinian Arabs who emigrated from their land are now living among their brothers in an atmosphere that is right for them and where they receive the best treatment.

The second is to claim that the country is small, that its resources are limited and that the Jews made homeless by the European war are still dreaming of going to Israel. This goal cannot be achieved without the departure of the Arabs.

Zionism and Racism

Zionism is thus trying to ascribe humanitarianism to its racist, aggressive and colonialist sectarianism and to erase the ghosts of the tragedy of the Palestinian Arabs from the minds of people. On the other hand, Zionism organizes through its numerous international papers and information media campaigns to urge the Jews to return to the motherland and to contribute funds and lives generously for this motherland. These are the broad lines of the means of the Zionist propaganda and efforts in the political, economic and intellectual fields throughout the world.

The peoples and nations that have not studied the intricacies of this issue and whose minds the counter propaganda has not been able to penetrate in a reasonable and acceptable manner--these peoples and nations take a position that believes in the soundness of the Zionist propaganda.

The question that should occur to the minds of the Arabs and the Muslims, rather to the mind of every free and honorable man, is: When and how do we confront this germ that is spread by world Zionism in the minds of people in all countries? When will our role rise to the level required to confront the Zionist danger?

It is worth noting that justice is not achieved automatically but with action and ceaseless efforts. Before we move in any direction to confront the international Zionist media, we must take cognizance of two important facts that have a big impact on raising our role to the level of these media:

1. The Zionist movement itself was founded and organized by Theodor Herzl, the skillful Austrian [Hungarian] journalist. Thus, journalism and the printed and visual information media have had an obvious role in strengthening Zionism and propagating its goals.

2. Zionism was primarily a movement of western Jewish academicians and intellectuals who kept up with the wheel of intellectual, political and economic development. These two facts indicate that the leadership of the world Zionist movement has been and continues to be in the hands of energetic and educated elements.

Planning for Confrontation

In the light of this reality, we must take the following observations into primary consideration in the sphere of confronting and answering Zionism:

1. Devoting vigilant care to the Arab and Islamic diplomatic missions in the western countries so that these missions may become more capable of confronting the hostile propaganda emanating from Zionism and from the papers linked with it directly or indirectly by answering such propaganda immediately and with effective means.
2. Studying the faulty concepts that Zionism has implanted in the minds and correcting these concepts in an educated and daring manner and through the various information media whose influence reaches the countries where Zionism moves with utter freedom.
3. Taking advantage of the independent political elements and papers in these countries so that they may explain the Palestinian problem with a logical, objective and humane approach that is totally free of all the impurities of sentiments and clowning. Such an approach is very essential in the eyes of those who are independent and neutral.
4. Sending capable journalists, lecturers and politicians who can communicate and converse with their colleagues in the languages of the countries visited and in the manner in which these colleagues favor so that the discussions and talks may help to strengthen the personal relations and to explain all aspects of the issues discussed.
5. The students sent from the Arab and Islamic countries to study in countries where the influence of Zionism or of its supporters is present should have a sufficient understanding of this sensitive issue and a high degree of general education and of the ability to associate and mingle with people and to influence them by their words, deeds and ethics.

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EGYPT

AL-TALMASANI DISCUSSES MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S STATUS, ACTIVITIES, RELATIONS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 7 Dec 79 pp 35-37

[Interview With 'Umar al-Talmasani, Leader of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, by Nash'at al-Taghlabi;" "Umar al-Talmasani, Brotherhood Leader, to AL-HAWADITH: Muslim Brotherhood Will Lead Entire World"]

[Text] Cairo--The Muslim Brotherhood supports the Iranian, Pakistani and Afghani revolutions and opposes the other revolutions. It also opposes the full recognition of Israel and the spread of Israeli goods in the Egyptian markets. It also considers the statement that the October war is the last war with Israel before the Arabs regain their full rights--a mistake that must be corrected. As for what is happening in Iran, it deserves backing and support as long as it is aimed against the enemies of Islam.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is in a strange position. The Brotherhood is a society that has its headquarters (No 1, al-Tawfiqiyah Street) and the headquarters has personnel and accountants, receives money and spends money. Yet, the Brotherhood does not have a legally recognized status. Rather, it is more correct to say that it has been banned from engaging in any activity since the reign of the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. This ban is still extant but is not enforced.

The Brotherhood issues a monthly magazine under the name of AL-DA'WAH which carries the Muslim Brotherhood's emblem--a Green circle with its upper part containing God's book in red and an inscription saying "it is a venerable Koran." Under the book there are two intersecting swords and in the lower part of the circle the word "and prepare" which is the first word of the phrase: "And prepare for them as much strength and as many horses as you can so as to strike fear in the hearts of the enemy of God and your enemy." The magazine's slogan is that it is "the voice of right, strength and freedom." But this magazine's status is also illegal because it is not licensed officially. Still, the magazine declares in its first page: "Managed and supervised by 'Umar al-Talmasani. Chief editor: Salih 'Ashmawi. Advertisements to be agreed upon with the management." The magazine is distributed in the various Arab countries, in Ethiopia, in Asmara and in Somalia and Freetown.

The Brotherhood has its groups in universities, schools and other places. But also the status of these groups is recognized by neither the state nor the Brotherhood itself. Still, in an article by 'Abd-al-Fattah Ahmad, AL-DA'WAH speaks of the phenomenon of the "spread of Islamic groups in numerous places, the most important being universities and schools." The magazine adds: "These groups, when finding that they cling to religion in an environment that is devoid of religion (...), called themselves or were right to call themselves the Islamic Group, i.e., the group that adheres to Islam in faith and in conduct." The magazine criticizes the system of education in the schools "because the non-religious subject matter that these schools offer their students sustains no life and quenches no thirst because it is closer to superficiality than to objectivity."

However, the Brotherhood refuses to resort to violence. It doesn't, for example, approve of the Atonement and Migration Group which assassinated Shaykh al-Dhahabi, a former minister of awqaf, because "even though the group had been formed out of zeal for Islam, it did not provide itself with enough and sound religious nourishment for this task. Therefore, it was natural that this group would go wrong and would deviate." This is why the magazine calls those in charge to "adopt the members of the Islamic groups and to support and assist them in performing their message through sincere ulema, original studies, sound instruction and faithful care so that they may form a good nucleus for an honorable Islamic society."

Even though the Brotherhood denies or, to put it more precisely, ignores all the relations it has with the outside world, it lets no opportunity slip by without expressing its support for any Islamic movement behind the borders and it allows no occasion to pass without exploiting it to say through it what the Brotherhood does not say directly. For example, the death of Abu-al-'A'la al-Mawdudi, the leader of the Islamic Group [presumably meaning Muslim Brotherhood] in Pakistan was an occasion to say: "The advocates of the Islamic call are thorns in the throats of despotic rulers and they are not liked by pharaohs, tyrants and despotic rulers." This is why "al-Mawdudi was the object of the wrath of the rulers who accused, tried and jailed him without proof or evidence." The Brotherhood has further said: "In their tribulation from 1954 until 1974, the Muslim Brotherhood members have been treated like this."

The Brotherhood supports Khomeyni's revolution through attacking the enemies of this revolution. Meanwhile, the Brotherhood attacks Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto because he persecuted the Pakistani Islamic Group. As for Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, "he seized power and ousted Bhutto in response to the Pakistani people's wish." Zia-ul-Haq has begun to apply the Shari'a, beginning with the "restriction on theft, the restriction of alcohol, the restriction on adultery and the restriction on murder" and ending with the abolition of usury within 3 years and applying all the teachings of the Islamic Shari'a.

The Brotherhood even declares, quoting Mawalana al-Tafil Muhammad, the amir of the Islamic group in Pakistan, "the imminent creation of the Islamic

state in Afghanistan." The Brotherhood further declares, also citing the same man, that the Islamic spirit that moved the youth of Iran to the holy struggle is "the fruit produced by Islamic writers such as Hasan al-Banna, Abu-al-'A'la al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutub, 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Awdah, Muhammad Iqbal and others."

So, the Brotherhood does not confine its activities to Egypt alone but goes beyond to Arab and non-Arab spheres to re-connect the links of the call that were broken by the campaign that 'Abd-al-Nasir had launched against this Brotherhood. The Brotherhood assures "the enemies of Islam that the Muslim Brotherhood movement will not die and that the Brotherhood's school is an institute in which all the clean Muslim youth on the face of the earth have studied." The Brotherhood exploits the phrase which President al-Sadat uttered at the People's Assembly, namely the phrase that "Islam is church and state," to attack those who call for separating politics from religion, saying that this concept is derived from "Kemal (meaning Ataturk), Turkey's henchman, or from 'Abd-al-Nasir, the former dictator of Egypt or from the shah of Iran, the ousted tyrant of that country." AL-DA'WAH has wondered why the (Egyptian) information media hailed al-Azhar when it issued a statement supporting the peace with Israel and why these media did not say at the time that religion was being involved with the heart of politics. AL-DA'WAH has further wondered why these media remained silent when the Islamic groups issued statements opposing the peace with Israel and why these media said at the time that there should be no religion in politics and no politics in religion!

This is why there has been numerous questions: What is the true size of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt? Does it form a group aspiring to persuade the government of the need for social, political and religious abidance by the Islamic Shari'a or does the Brotherhood aspire to seize power so that it may implement the Shari'a according to its own concept of application, as has happened in Iran or in Pakistan (where the group operates through the government) or as in Afghanistan where the creation of the Islamic state is expected (shortly)? What is the Brotherhood's position toward the various Islamic movements or the movements of some Islamic groups in the Arab countries, especially in Syria? What are the Brotherhood's means for achieving its goals? Does the Brotherhood intend to codify its conditions or does its present situation give it greater freedom of action? These and other questions raised can be answered by one man only, namely 'Umar al-Talmasani, the Brotherhood leader in Egypt.

But 'Umar al-Talmasani refuses to engage in dialogue. He is very reserved and his answers are so brief that they raise further questions. His argument for his reservation and for his brief answers is that "he can only answer within the limits of his information" and that "the limit of his information does not surpass the limits of his answers."

Is this true?

Without answering this question, we must take into our consideration that the Brotherhood is eager or is compelled, because of its circumstances, not to evoke any official reactions to its positions. Consequently, these positions must remain within a certain framework that does not clash strongly with "the Brotherhood's illegal legitimacy." The Brotherhood is not, as we have already pointed out, recognized officially. Therefore, it engages in its activities under the canopy of what the officials call "the democratic tolerance" and under the canopy "of the eyes that are vigilant to every move it makes."

Consequently, we can understand--and this is a personal interpretation--the very brief answers given by 'Umar al-Talmasani. Yet, these answers expose significant dimensions even though they are not sufficiently clear, except in connection with the Brotherhood's position toward the events in Iran on the one hand and in Syria on the other. This is a position that shows obvious contradiction, as we shall see later.

Those well-informed with the Muslim Brotherhood's activities assert that the Brotherhood has a considerable credit in numerous circles, especially among the students, and that "the return to religion" which came in the wake of the so-called "communist domination" of the state's various political and social agencies in the 1960's could not pass without being exploited by the Muslim Brotherhood. These well-informed people also assert that the efforts exerted by the state to absorb this phenomenon through mobilizing its information media to respond to the religious aspirations have not borne all the desired fruits because these efforts had to be balanced and remote from radicalism, considering the dire need to establish a firm link between the teachings of religion and the necessities of the age.

But this inclination has faced the strong opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is true that the opposition has not been direct. The Brotherhood, by virtue of its circumstances, does not want to clash with the state. But it is also true that the Brotherhood's opposition is clear through its confrontation of any call underlining the impossibility of dropping the necessities of the age from the sphere of applying the Islamic Shari'a.

For example, the Brotherhood accuses Dr Mustafa Mahmud, a modern advocate of Islam, because he states that the Islamic rule and Shari'a cannot be established in this age without iron repression and terror. The Brotherhood attacks Dr Mustafa Mahmud because he has volunteered to explain to the Muslims how the call for Islam is carried out and when and how this call is realized.

How dare Dr Mustafa Mahmud urge the Muslim to "reform himself first and then reform his kinsmen and neighbors" and how dare he consider anything beyond this "dreams to overwhelm and desires to rule and dominate because releasing armed groups to purge the hearts will only produce hatred among the people for whatever is religious!"

It is evident that the campaign against Dr Mustafa Mahmud follows the example of the proverb that says: "The words are addressed to you, daughter-in-law, but are meant for you, neighbor."

But these words alone are not enough if they are not coupled with organized action. Is the organized action possible, and liable to survive, if it is not coupled with a legal status that provides greater freedom of action within the bounds of the law?

[Question] This is why I asked 'Umar al-Talmasani, the Muslim Brotherhood leader: What is the Muslim Brotherhood at present and how does it carry out its activities?

[Answer] The state does not recognize the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood at present. The Brotherhood challenges nobody and, therefore, it has no activities. Even if we admit that it has its activity, then it is axiomatic that this activity would not be announced openly.

[Question] Is it a secret organization then?

I did not expect an answer to this question. However, there is no doubt that the components of "existence" are present in the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has a headquarter, as we have already said, and the headquarters entrance displays prominently a big sign bearing in its upper part the emblem of the Muslim Brotherhood in the form of a sun or a moon sending its rays of light to mosques as the symbol of Islam. The Brotherhood also has its magazine. In the headquarters and in the magazine there are employees and both are frequented by many visitors. The headquarters turned at prayer times into something like a mosque where the call for prayer is raised and where everybody proceeds to pray. During the prayers, it is impossible to have telephone contacts with the headquarters because the employee in charge lifts "the receiver." Meeting with al-Talmasani at the headquarters, especially if the meeting is for a press interview, is conditional upon being brief and short because al-Talmasani is very busy! So, why isn't the Brotherhood's activity declared openly? Why doesn't the Brotherhood engage in its activity like any other party?

On the basis of this visualization, I asked al-Talmasani:

[Question] Do you think that the Brotherhood should remain a brotherhood or it should turn into a party? And can it be a purely religious party or a party that derives its principles from the Islamic Shari'a?

[Answer] Since its foundation, the Muslim Brotherhood has never approved of the idea of parties. Therefore, it will never become a party. In human affairs, (Islam does not know of a secular action unrelated to religion, as it knows of no structure, whatever its form, that does not subject any secular action, regardless of its nature, to the teachings of religion).

In other words, there is no distinction between the secular action and the religious action, i.e., there is no distinction between politics and religion. Yet, more explanation was needed. Therefore, I asked al-Talmasani:

[Question] The debate on separating religion from politics, or on whether politics should be or should not be a part of the religious creed, it still going on. What is your opinion on this topic?

[Answer] The Muslim Brotherhood has said hundreds of times that Islam is a comprehensive system covering all affairs of life which, if conducted on the basis of the Koran and the Sunna, lead to heaven.

Because Islam is a system that covers all affairs of life, the Muslim Brotherhood puts the October war in the scales, lauding the memory of this war in which the Egyptian army performed its duty in a manner that exceeded all expectations. The Brotherhood then proceeds to enumerate the points against the peace initiative, the two Camp David accords and the peace treaty, opposing the full recognition of Israel, objecting to giving Israel the opportunity that enables it to harm Islam and the Muslims and opposing the spread of Israeli goods in the Egyptian markets after the normalization of relations because this will pose a danger to our goods. The Brotherhood also opposes the statement that the October war is the last war between us and Israel, even though "we did not regain our full rights in this war." The Brotherhood also considers the insistence of the Israeli press and broadcasting stations on saying that the Muslim Brotherhood members in Egypt are Israel's real enemies "an intervention in our domestic affairs that is not permitted by international laws." The brotherhood also expresses its regret for "the severance of our relations with most of the Islamic countries, even though we do not believe that the cure lies in the means that these countries adopted toward Egypt after the treaty." The Brotherhood couples all this with warnings of "the most serious phase that Egypt will face throughout its entire history, namely the phase in which normalization of the relations with the sons of Israel will start" because the "characteristics of the Jews prevent them from living with others peacefully. They have distorted the bible and the Talmud and have planned to control the entire world."

I then proceed with al-Talmasani to another urgent issue raised at a large scale in the wake of the Iranian revolution:

[Question] After the Iranian revolution, numerous interpretations have emerged regarding the possibility of uniting the fundamental Islamic sects, even though those making the interpretations acknowledge personally that this is impossible. The Iranian revolution, which has raised the slogan of Islam, proceeded to commit actions that have created doubts among many people, considering that this revolution has resorted to violence and that it has not been much different from other revolutions.

[Answer] (Al-Talmasani gave a strange answer to this question when he said:) I have not been to Iran to know the true situation there. All that we know about the revolution is what we read in the newspapers. I don't believe that

anybody who respects his opinion declares it on the basis of what is said in the newspapers, some of which are pro and some against [the revolution]. Between these and those, the facts are undoubtedly lost. I know that attempts have been made for tens of years [to unify the sects] but have produced no decisive result. Religious principles, be they Shi'ite, Sunni, Christian or Judaic, are easy [sic] to change!

A few days before this answer was given, AL-DA'WAH, organ of the Muslim Brotherhood, had published an article by 'Abd-al-Mun'im Salim Jibarah expressing absolute support for the Iranian revolution (even though the true situation there was not verified) and attacking violently Shapur Bakhtiar," the western-educated atheist who is married to a French woman, and his cousin Saymur Bakhtiar who founded the Savak (the Iranian intelligence)." The attack extended to include "those calling for jailing Islam in the mosque, the fronts of the lackey nationalists, secularists, socialists and revolutionaries" and "the plot of the allies (in World War I) to separate the church from the state, to abolish the Islamic caliphate in its capacity as the instrument for rallying the Muslims, to drive the Muslims apart through nationalism as a prelude for isolating Palestine and setting up the Jewish state and to isolate Turkey from Islam" because "the advocates of nationalism, like the advocates of secularism, have their history which abounds with treason and lackeyhood" and because "the Muslims under the canopy of Islam are most eager for unity while under the canopy of nationalities, they are the quickest to disperse." Under Khomeyni, "everything in Iran must be Islamic. The ruler must respond and fulfill and the advocates for anything other than Islam must remain in their holes or God's sentence must be carried against them."

The article adds: Today, Islam is a Koran and a sword, politics and economy, the mosque and the street and "the truths of the Iranian revolution are stronger than to be concealed or distorted. The liberties present in Iran nowadays are enjoyed even by the archenemies of Islam. When the most dangerous advocates (calling for the destruction of Islam) exploit these liberties, then this is a sign of the health and vitality of a people who have decided to determine their future."

What does this mean?

It means that the Muslim Brotherhood's view of what is happening in Iran is clear, even though no visit has been made to Iran to verify the truth, and that what is happening deserves their--the Muslim Brothers'--support and backing. This means support for Khomeyni's violence, as long as it is aimed against the enemies of Islam!

But there is another side to the picture. To make this side clear, I ask:

[Question] The campaign launched in Syria against the Muslim Brotherhood there has extended to include the Muslim Brotherhood generally, considering that the Muslim Brothers have relations with each other whether they are in Syria or elsewhere. Those launching the campaign conclude this

[connection] from the fact that the campaign faced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1952 had a direct impact in Syria. What is your opinion of this?

[Answer] (Here, al-Talmasani answers directly:) Every event in any Islamic country stirs emotions in all the Islamic countries. In fact, we are not pleased by any ruler in any country of the world, be it Islamic or not, who massacres members of his people on the pretext that they disagree with him in opinion. This is an axiomatic attitude among all those who are just.

Do we understand from this decisive answer that al-Talmasani has gone to Syria--which he has not done--and verified the situation there and has not, consequently, relied on reading the newspapers? Don't the acts of violence in Iran include the massacring of Muslim citizens?

We wish that we could explain this point, except that al-Talmasani rejects the principle of dialogue and insists on definite and limited answers without any expansion, i.e., answers solely within the limits of what he knows.

In any case, the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in its magazine has been inspired by these same answers. While we notice praise for Khomeyni's Iranian revolution and Zia-ul-Haq's Pakistani Government, we notice at the same time that the magazine devotes a number of its pages to attack the "Ba'thist revolution" in Syria and to ascribe to it a sectarian character, even though al-Talmasani has said: "As for religious principles, they are easy [sic] to change, be they Shi'ite, Sunni, Christian, Judaic--even Judaic--or anything else." Al-Talmasani has already denounced discrimination among Muslims.

On the other hand, al-Talmasani refused to acknowledge the Muslim Brotherhood's relations with the numerous other Islamic groups in Egypt. He has even gone as far as leaving the matter to the authorities. When I asked him:

[Question] I believe that the religious activities of the Muslim Brotherhood include at present the student and worker circles where small groups called the "Brotherhood groups" have been formed. Is there a definite bond uniting these groups or are they formed out of a religious motive and without having any relationship with one another?

[Answer] (Despite what has been published in Al-DA'WAH about these groups, he answered:) The Brotherhood has no organizations among any Egyptian circles, not the worker circles, not the student circles and not any other circles. But if any organization claims that it has a connection with us, then this is something over which we have no control. Dealing with such claims is the government's concern.

The Muslim Brotherhood had many connections with the Egyptian Revolution Council before and after July 1952. Then a clash erupted between the two sides shortly after the revolution. Many Muslim Brotherhood members went

to jail, others were pursued relentlessly and others yet were executed. That period also deserves being discussed in detail. But al-Talmasani was reserved in this regard also. When I asked him:

[Question] The Muslim Brotherhood had strong relations with the 23 July revolution before, during and after the inception of this revolution. Why did those relations deteriorate suddenly? Was it a change in the revolution's direction or was it the political aspirations of the Brotherhood?

[Answer] (He answered briefly, relying on a unilateral position:) The revolution denies having any relations with the Brotherhood. Therefore, there is no place for talking of a sudden change as long as one of the two sides to the issue does not acknowledge the presence of the relationship.

[Question] What is the truth of the weapons incident for whose concealment the revolution leadership sought the help of the Brotherhood?

[Answer] The Brotherhood knows nothing about these weapons. Those who have brought up the issue and talked about it are the ones to be asked.

The one who brought up this issue is a member of the Brotherhood who has said that the weapons were concealed in his house. Therefore, there is a premeditated attempt to ignore certain fundamental facts. Consequently, the interview had to be concluded with a final question. So I asked:

[Question] How do you view the future of the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand and the future of Islam in the Arab world generally on the other hand?

[Answer] The future is unknown and the unknown is known to God alone. However, we are fully confident that the Muslims will lead the entire world to peace, security and prosperity if they cling to their religion and if they apply the teachings of this religion to themselves before they ask other people to apply them.

Two days after this interview, 'Umar al-Talmasani left Egypt for treatment and recuperation. May God give him health and strength.

[Box on Page 37]

[Text] Law No 10 Permits Delinquency!

It is the opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood that law No 10 issued in 1966 to protect public morals provides frankly for permitting delinquency and encouraging delinquents. The law stipulates that in case a man and a woman are caught committing vice [having sexual intercourse] in a place, they shall be considered not guilty if the man claims that the woman is his girlfriend. As for immoral acts in cars, those committing such acts shall not be questioned as long as the car is closed and its lights turned off. If a woman is tried in court after being arrested for the first time for committing

the act of prostitution, the law stipulates that the sentence be suspended, even if it is the thousandth and one time in which the woman has committed the act!

Rotary Is Enemy of Islam

The Muslim Brotherhood is focusing its attack on the Rotary clubs which it considers an arm of the Zionist Freemasonry. The Brotherhood says that the clubs disseminate atheism and libertinism among peoples, fight religions and sanctify sex. The Brotherhood then proceeds to ask: Will the cultural relations with the Jews include permitting them to establish Masonic lodges openly, in addition to the openly widespread Rotary clubs now present in Egypt? Will they also be allowed to establish Jehovah's Witnesses societies? Will the economic relations include permitting the Jews to establish gambling casinos and the other well-known things?

The Brotherhood attacked Anis Manusr, the chief editor of OCTOBER, indirectly when it said: Some Arabs have uttered blasphemies when they dreamt of an Arab world in which the Jewish expertise cooperates with the Arab labor and Arab oil.

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YUGOSLAV FILMMAKER DESCRIBES SCENES OF EVERYDAY LIFE

Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 19-23 Nov 79

[An account of a journey through Iran by car by Zeljko Malnar as told to V. Partonic]

[19 Nov 79, p 4]

[Text] Border Crossing

Our Correspondent

Zeljko Malnar is a film director, documentary filmmaker and writer of travelogues. He is a graduate of the Institute for Mass Communications in Delhi Ornofilm Department. Thus far he has made thirty documentary films, some of which have been shown on Yugoslav television, for example on the program "Sunday Afternoon." One of Malnar's films ("Solar Consciousness") won first prize at the Montreal Documentary Film Festival. As an expert on Asian countries and affairs he has published a number of travelogue essays in Yugoslav periodicals. Malnar is a regular foreign correspondent for Radio-Television Zagreb and for Belgrade's "Radio-TV Review" program.

"Welcome to Iran" says the English-language sign. Obviously, no one thought it was necessary to take down the blue signboard with its greeting to foreign visitors that was erected while the Shah was still in power. The border police are dressed just as they always were in American-made uniforms, very tight-fitting, with white belts and holstered sidearms.

The same "Harley-Davidson" motorcycles, which make such a big impression on newcomers, are still parked all around. And just as before, in a way that fills onlookers with feelings of envy and, to some extent, uneasiness, the young men in the police uniforms, with their white helmets and mandatory sunglasses, mill around their motorcycles, mount them, and with a loud roar tear down the road at full speed until they disappear from sight.

The baggage check is just as routine as it always was accompanied by a cursory check of passports and a few of the usual questions.

On crossing the border into Iran one does not get any hint at all of the changes that have taken place in that country in recent months. On the contrary. One cannot help but wonder why, as we were passing through Turkey, just on the other side of the Iranian border, people asked us why we were going to Iran, what we wanted to do there and mentioned that we ought to think twice before going ahead.

When we asked them why they thought we should reconsider, they could only reply, with a shrug of their shoulders and an ominous shaking of their heads, that, "Strange things are going on over there...."

And yet we did not experience anything that was in the least strange or unusual as we crossed the border and entered the Kurdish section of Azerbaijan. The former appearance of the border-crossing point had not changed in the slightest detail.

Roadside Altercations

The belief that all of the changes which Iran had gone through in recent months since Khomeyni's victorious return to that country had not yet been able to exert an impact on the border districts and that we would soon have a chance to experience them firsthand quickly proved to be correct. In fact our first encounter with these changes started after we had been on the road for only 7 or 8 hours, driving along the same route taken before us by those proud and one might say inspiring young men on their "Harley-Davidsons."

In the late afternoon, when we were already very tired and anxiously waiting to catch a glimpse of some larger town where we could get something to eat and take a little break, we were forced to come to a stop in the middle of the road.

All of a sudden, as if they somehow materialized out of thin air, a group of young men armed to the teeth appeared in front of our jeep and ordered us to come to a stop. They said they were members of "Khomeyni's Committees" and that they were required to check the papers of all after-curfew drivers and search their vehicles. Even though they were clean-shaven and dressed quite casually in jeans, some kind of American-style jackets and tennis shoes, all of which needless to say did not inspire us with much confidence, we did not have any other choice but to give in and do whatever they said. Their machine guns made more of an impression than their overall appearance.

They seemed to be upset and even angry when we replied in answer to their questions that we did not have any whiskey or porno magazines. They ordered us to unload all of our baggage and to lay it out on the ground. They looked through every suitcase, every nook and cranny in the jeep and conducted a strip search of our own persons. They did not find anything they were looking for and told us that we could pack up and go on our way. The looks they gave us in response to our polite suggestion that they ought to put things back the way they found them clearly told us that they did not think that that was their responsibility and that we would have to do it ourselves.

Perhaps because this was the first time something like this had happened we were pretty indignant. But later on we got used to it and realized that in Iran road searches are a natural and everyday occurrence. Things could probably not be otherwise in a country going through so much turmoil as it proceeds to tear down the old order and build a new one, a country which is threatened by many dangers and in which extreme vigilance is a vital and unavoidable necessity.

Still we were rather amazed that the first thing they asked for was whiskey and porno magazines. But we got used to these questions too, since we were subjected to similar searches every day and had to answer the same questions during our entire trip which led us from Turkey, through Iran to Afghanistan and back.

A Major Mishap

However, these encounters did not always amount to nothing more than searches and interrogations. At about the halfway mark on our trip through Iran, while we were crossing the so-called Great Salt Desert, we came to the realization that this sort of unpleasantness could sometimes escalate into a major predicament. The things that happened to us at this point on our journey helped us to become aware of the fact that we were in fact very lucky and that things could have turned out very differently for us.

I was driving when my travelling companion pointed to someone waving at us who was standing on the side of the road a short distance ahead. "We had better pick up the poor guy, otherwise who knows when he will find a ride into town," he said. I had a bit better idea as to what was really going on and answered: "It's not a matter of whether we want to, rather we have to stop. That guy is waving at us with a machine gun."

Once again we unloaded all of our luggage and once again we answered all of their questions, but this time we were not able to continue on our way. Our "committeeman" climbed into the jeep and drove off, leaving us alone in the middle of the Great Salt Desert. Our only consolation was the fact that, just as he started to drive off, he stopped and yelled back at us: "I'll be back, wait for me."

Seeing as we did not have any other choice, we waited. And we waited no more or less than 3 full days. Since by that time we had drunk and eaten up everything that we had with us, when the young man returned with several of his peers, 17-year-olds, we were dying of thirst and hunger. Nevertheless, we were lucky that he came back at all, so we silently accepted his explanation or maybe excuse to the effect that "he had to move his girlfriend and family from one village to another and that he really needed our jeep...."

We got into the jeep and went on our way. While the roadside searches and interrogations were understandable to us as a precautionary measure in a closed country and even though we had become reconciled to this practice, this particular experience filled us with exactly the opposite feelings. But, even though this was probably the biggest trouble we got into, other, similar incidents were in the offing....

[20 Nov 79, p 6]

[Text] Secret Lunch

Hungry and thirsty, tired and all on edge after our 3-day ordeal in the Great Salt Desert, and angry at the undisciplined "committeemen" that had made life so rough for us, we caught sight of a town in the distance and at once started looking forward to a real, full meal and a soft bed. It seemed to us, probably because this is what we wanted so much, that our troubles were at an end and that we would finally have a chance to get acquainted with another, calmer and better side of life in Iran.

We believed that anyone who had made the trip from the border to here and who had gone through all these searches and interrogations would be greeted in the town as safe, trustworthy and welcome guests about whom no one would have any reasons to be suspicious. In this case, we believed, all of the precautionary measures to which we had been subjected, with the exception of our unfortunate encounter with that "merry" band of armed young men, were entirely justified. We had to and we wanted to give the benefit of the doubt to a people who are living and working in a closed and still unfortunate country and who are trying to do what they have to do as best they can, even though their efforts in this direction are sometimes rather clumsy.

But, by the same token, we had completely forgotten that this was the month of Ramadan and that at this point in time this religious holiday possesses a greater significance for Iranians than it did at the time when I came here while the Shah was still in power. But as foreigners, and even more so as non-Moslems, we expected that we would not be bound by all the rules which were laid down with the establishment of an Islamic state.

We realized how mistaken we were as soon as we entered the town. Not only were we unable to get anything to eat in a single restaurant, we could not find anything to eat or drink anywhere, not even in grocery stores. Nobody would open their doors to us.

Considering the state we were in, we were forced to turn to the authorities for help.

Not Authorized

Leaving my companion behind, who felt worse than I did, I went off to search for some kind of help from someone. Naturally, who else does a person turn to first for help when he is in trouble but the police. They were easy enough to find, since their headquarters building was marked by a big sign in English.

Filled with hope, I walked up to a man who seemed to me to be the highest ranking officer in the station. I explained to him how we had spent 3 hard days in the salt desert probably thanks to some "overpreoccupied 'committeemen'" how as a result we had run out of our own supplies of food and water, that we were exhausted and that we would like them to help us find a meal and some lodgings. Much to my surprise, the officer who had listened to my story with the greatest understanding and even sympathy shrugged his shoulders helplessly and replied: "I am sorry, but we are not authorized to assist you."

"We are desperately in need to help. My friend is sick. If you cannot help us, is there anyone around here who could do us this small favor, at least to provide us with a little food. Otherwise, we can always spend the night in our jeep," I pleaded, by now completely discouraged. "Once again, I am very sorry, but we do not have any authority here at all. All we do is direct traffic," the officer said starting to get a little excited. "Is there anyone here who does have any authority?" I asked. "Yes, Khomeyni's committees," he answered and went on to tell me where I could find the nearest such committee.

It was not very far away, and I soon found myself standing in front of a large, attractive two-story building which was surrounded by a very nice garden. I walked into the house, which until recently had obviously been the property of some really well-to-do person. It was filled with fashionable furniture, thick Persian carpets on the floors and the walls were decorated with paintings and tapestries. All over the house, reclining against the walls, I could see young men between 16 and 17 years old who were unshaven, dressed in jeans and with their mandatory machine guns close at hand. It seemed as though no one had noticed my entry into the house, nor did anyone look at me or say anything.

"Who is in charge here?" I asked in a loud voice. They looked at me in amazement, but once again no one said anything. Finally, one of the young men got up off the floor and walked up to me, casually holding his machine gun under his arm. "What do you want?" he asked almost brusquely.

So I proceeded to tell him the whole story. He heard me out, but he did not seem to be very concerned. When I had finished he merely mumbled: "Let's see your papers." He scrutinized my passport for a long time, and in the meantime I took a good look at him. Here he is barely 18 years old and here we are depending on him. But that is the way it goes. I waited for him to say something. "You are from some sort of socialist country," he concluded finally. "Yes," I said. "We cannot help you. Wait till tomorrow and your case will be considered by one of our comrades," he said and went back to his place to lie down, thereby informing me that our conversation was at an end.

Hungary and Fearful

I left the house in a despondent frame of mind. I went back to the jeep and, quite hopelessly and aimlessly, started to drive slowly around the town. All of the stores were closed. All of the coffee houses were locked up. People were walking through the streets silently. The police and the "committeemen" kept a close watch on everything that was going on. And the veiled women in their traditional black cloaks made the whole scene seem even grimmer and more incredible. Our own condition and mood probably added to this impression.

Then, all of a sudden while we were driving by a construction site, I thought I saw a group of workers, sitting behind a ramshackle fence, poking away at something in some dishes. I stopped the jeep and went over to them. The

men looked at me silently and warily, with their mouths full of food even though they had stopped chewing. So as not to alarm them by my sudden appearance I at once started to tell them the whole story about what happened to us, what the police told me and how we were greeted at the committee headquarters....

Who knows for how much longer I would have gone on talking if one of the hefty men had not waved his hand and invited us to join them. "There'll be a little bread and tea for you two, so get yourselves over here," he said and resumed eating. Naturally, we did not wait for a second invitation. We ate our food greedily and gulped down mouthfuls of warm tea.

After we finished eating, our host went on to say: "We are Moslems and this is Ramadan. But who can get through an entire working day without something to eat and drink. It's easy for those committee people. They don't do anything all day except lie around, so they can hold out. We have to work, and if someone sees us eating or drinking we'll be in for a flogging. That is why we have posted lookouts at all three corners of the construction site. And now that we have finished our lunch another four men will do guard duty so that the others can come back for something to eat and drink. They spotted you right away, but we decided that you are foreigners and that you did not mean us any harm. Moreover, you were so pitiful looking..."

We parted as good friends, slapped each other on the back and laughed. "Things will get better," we said as we left them. But they just shrugged their shoulders without too much conviction.

With vague feelings of anger and satisfaction, irritation and sympathy we got in the jeep and drove on.

[21 Nov 79, p 6]

[Text] SAVAK Agents' Black Market

Altogether our visit to Iran lasted 2 weeks, but still we ran out of money. We had to pay much higher prices for food than we had expected. And we ran out of the supplies we had brought with us sooner than we had expected. So the time finally came when we were forced to start changing dollars. I recalled the way things used to be on this score, thinking that things might be pretty much the same now. Of course, I was fooling myself, and in a big way at that.

I knew that the official exchange rate was 70 rials to the dollar. The fact that all along the way people asked me whether I wanted to change foreign currency, offering higher exchange rates than they had to, struck me as being a provocation. They are changing money at double the official exchange rate, I thought, and if I accept they will report me to the "committeemen". Consequently, I thought it would be better to wait until we got to Tehran. There we will have a much better idea as to what is really going on and we will not have any problems with the authorities....

As it turned out I was wrong. In any event, I was just as wrong on many previous occasions whenever I made comparisons between the Iran of yesterday and Iran of today. Or whenever I drew conclusions based on presumed similarities and comparisons.

Then and Now

We made it to Tehran. This is where we planned to change money. As we drove toward an official exchange office which I remembered I started thinking about the way things were while the Shah was in power. At that time the clerks that waited on us in the exchange office were extremely rude. "We do not like to exchange dollars, since the rial is much stronger than the dollar," they would say frowning at the American currency which we handed them. "But the law is the law," they agreed reluctantly, "and we have to obey it. We will exchange the dollars for you. But if you want to exchange your leftover rials for dollars before you leave the country, please come see us, since we will be much happier to perform that transaction than we are to perform this one. We are doing it for now only because we have to."

Even though I did not expect that today's exchange transaction would be handled just like it was then, I still had no way of knowing that things would be so much different or even completely the reverse. On the black market, whose services are available everywhere on the streets of Tehran, they were offering us 140 rials to the dollar, that is, double the official rate.

We did not accept. We were Yugoslavs in a friendly country which we wish well and where we had no intention of making trouble for ourselves, so we looked for an official exchange office. It is better to have an official currency exchange certificate than to change money on the black market. The last thing we needed here was to get ourselves branded as some kind of black marketeers.

But, however much we wanted to be completely honest and above board and tried to stay that way, we could not pull it off. With the approval of "Khomeyni's committees," the official exchange offices offered us 140 rials to the dollar, the same rate offered on the foreign-currency black market. So there was no longer any reason for us to have any qualms or reservations. We changed our money and got an official certificate with a signature and a stamp. The only hitch was the the bills we changed had to be in denominations of at least \$100.00, since the rate was lower for bills of smaller denominations. I asked why this was so. I quickly found out and was shocked.

More Portable

The first thing we found out, from conversations with Tehranians, was that dollars are exchanged in this manner so as to make it easier for the former secret agents of the SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, to leave the country. These people are enormously wealthy and are willing to sell their dollars at a rate two times lower than the official rate just so they can get their hands on some dollars to take them when they cross the border. And on the black market it is the \$100.00 bills that command the highest price, since large sums of money concealed in this way are easier to carry out of the country.

The reason why the official exchange offices agree to change money at the same rate as that offered by the black market is because otherwise no one would bother to change money in these offices, but would instead take their business to illegal money changers. The fact that the former SAVAK agents are willing to trade in their dollars at a rate that is twice as expensive is also in the interest of the new government. This is simply due to the fact that the government wants to make sure that these "fugitives" have to go to a lot of trouble to get what they want--otherwise they would not have lingered in Iran for as long as they have--and in this way they have enabled the present government to make them pay a high price for getting what they want.

In any event it is clear that the black marketeers are always accessible to the denounced members of the Shah's former police. These people know who to look for, since they were in possession of all the dossiers and they were the ones who conducted all the interrogations, so they knew how to find people who were willing to do anything to get money and to make a big profit. Considering that even now money is no object for former SAVAK agents, it is no wonder that they have managed to ensnare all of those people for whom making money is more important than the great and glorious Islamic Republic.

In Iran getting across the border and leaving the country is these days a very expensive business. Later on we had an opportunity to find out just how expensive it really is, and this was by no means a pleasant experience. But while we were still in Tehran, looking at the life of the city around us, we became acquainted with the many other changes that had taken place in this country since the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi.

Our departure from Iran was still a long way off. This was not on our minds, nor did we really understand everything that was going on around us. At this point we were happy to be inside the country and to have the chance to see and film all of those things that interested us, and this was why we came here in the first place.

Outrageous Treatment for Brave Women

For someone like myself, who had visited Iran on three previous occasions during the Shah's reign, the picture presented by the Tehran of today was in a certain sense a real shock. In a city where women used to walk the streets in complete freedom, as in any European city, there now walked instead some sort of veiled figures, dressed in black from head to toe, whose very eyes were invisible. We drove through the capital city in our jeep looking all around us with a natural kind of curiosity, and we were amazed to see that the former image of this city had changed so drastically. We were witnesses to tragedies in which women were run over by automobiles in the otherwise dense and chaotic street traffic of Tehran simply because, hidden behind their veils, they could not see well enough to determine the direction and distance of oncoming cars. This is because nowadays their eyes can no longer be seen or are not permitted to be seen, and so they themselves can no longer see well enough to know what is going on around them. And so they die....

What is most distressing is that in Tehran one can still see some of those unaffected, brave women who walk through the streets dressed like they used to and go about their business paying no attention to the objections of their fellow citizens. However, the vulgar remarks and insults addressed to them by other passersby filled us with a kind of rage which was indescribable the first time we witnessed such behavior. I could not even walk 10 meters without observing some pedestrian, especially "committeemen" or policemen, who probably consider this to be their duty, hurling the most vulgar and brutal insults at these women.

But these women simply go on their way, paying no attention to these remarks and seemingly undisturbed, letting everyone know that they do not agree with everything that has been wrought by the establishment of an Islamic Republic. They were probably stirred by the same feelings we experienced as we took all this in, without reacting and without doing anything at all to come to their defense, just as none of the other passersby did anything to speak up for these women. But in all of this we were completely certain of at least one thing, namely that in Iran there had been a great many changes.

[22 Nov 79, p 6]

[Text] From Praise to Invective

Tehran made a somber impression on us in spite of its crowded and noisy streets. This was probably because we had visited this city on previous occasions, whereas now everything seemed to us to be strange and unearthly. The women, hidden beneath their black chadors, look almost like specters; ever since imam Khomeyni banned the playing of music all one hears are funeral marches; beggars are inconsiderate and even rude in their assaults on passersby, especially foreigners. There are so many beggars that one is bound to ask oneself where they all were during the Shah's reign, what did he do with them and where did he keep them.

One inevitably senses and can almost touch some sort of insidious, hidden fear that has crept into the lives of these people. With vacant expressions, as if they do not know exactly where they are going, they wander through the streets and stop only in places where some mullah is giving a fiery speech and explaining some issue by quoting the Koran. And here, without waiting to find out what the speech is really about, they all of a sudden join in with all the rest who are shouting and yelling and ominously raising their fists at someone or at us, foreigners, the invisible enemy.

Since we did not want to be left to shift for ourselves without a guide and since we needed someone who could provide an explanation for all of the things that were happening around us, and we did try to have these things explained to us by Iranians and not by foreigners like ourselves. I remembered some of my acquaintances whom I had met during my previous visits to Iran. These were young intellectuals, mostly university students or professors and lecturers, with whom I had once held highly interesting conversations while listening to their extremely harsh criticisms of the Shah's regime, telling them all about Yugoslavia, and, all in all, having a wonderful time in the process. At the same time I had a chance to learn some new things about a different country and its affairs.

It was only natural that I should now look them up again and solicit their views on current events in Iran.

We found them without too much difficulty. Although they were not teaching any classes, we did run into some of them in front of the faculty building engaged in a discussion just like they were when we first met. I was surprised that they seemed somewhat taken aback when they recognized me, as if they were not all that glad to see me but did not want to show it. I pretended not to pay any attention to this reaction and behaved as I usually did in their company. I reminded them of our previous meeting and, it seemed, barely succeeded in persuading them that we should get together that same evening.

After a few reserved greetings and an exchange of the usual questions and answers along the lines of "how are you--I am fine," we sat down together and embarked upon a rather strange sort of interrogation, similar to that which we experienced in our encounters with the "committeemen" along Iran's highways. I told them the reason for our visit, that I wanted to shoot a documentary film on contemporary Iran, that I was very glad that the hated Shah had been overthrown and that their people were finally free, that I am their friend as I always had been, and that I would like to hear their explanation for the things I had seen thus far and which I did not understand. To my amazement they were somehow too reserved, almost unbelieving, and after they had loosened up a little I heard some fervent speeches about the Islamic revolution, about Khomeyni, the Revolutionary Council, about the "American pigs," and then, much to my consternation, somebody mentioned something about the "communist pigs." I simply could not believe what I was hearing. I tried to look at things in their proper perspective, to find some explanation for what I was hearing and to discern the reasons for such a change in attitude, but I failed. It seemed as though I had run head on into a solid wall of silence which I could not penetrate.

I was very disappointed as I said goodbye to my friends. I could not fathom how these young men--who used to hold us Yugoslavs in such high esteem, who used to ask me to tell them all about socialism, about the freedom of the working class, about free elections and about all of the other ideas which they found to be strange but appealing--could have changed so much in such a short period of time, assumed different identities and adopted attitudes that were diametrically opposed to the views they once held, and not all that long ago at that.

One of the most interesting of the young men I had interviewed on my former visits, a student of philosophy, nevertheless decided to go with us, on the pretext that we would be giving him a ride home in our jeep. And it was indeed true that he lived a long way off. As I was very disillusioned and, God knows, more than a little angry, I kept quiet as we drove along. But after a while he finally said something.

He told me that it had become very disagreeable for them to talk and meet with foreigners, that they are duty-bound to report such meetings to "Khomeyni's committees," that it is especially troublesome to maintain contacts with foreign journalists or filmmakers, and I happened to be a filmmaker, and that this is because of the vicious campaign being waged against Iran by Western newspapers and magazines.

I understood this and realized that there was indeed a lot of truth in what he was saying, but I was forced to recall the phrase "communist pigs" and to ask for an explanation. He tried to tell me that this was a result of recent events in Iran, during which the left wing of the united anti-Shah movement started to divorce itself from Khomeyni, people in many districts started to hold the Ayatollah Taleqani in higher esteem than Khomeyni, and a split had developed among the leaders of the revolution, thereby giving rise to dissension among the populace in general.

Since I still did not agree with what he was saying, he went on to tell me the story of what happened to one of his friends. He said that his friend was riding the bus one day while he leafed through a book by Marx. Absorbed in what he was reading, he did not even notice that the other passengers were starting to get excited, having seen the book he was reading. It was not until they started shouting and demanded that the driver stop the bus that he realized what was going on. They then grabbed him and drug him outside, roughing him up along the way. He then barely succeeded in tearing himself away and escaping a public lynching. This then is the current mood of the Tehranians. Even though I could and had to believe, if not approve of, some of the things I had heard, the image of Iran which I had when I arrived here had by now greatly changed.

Seeing that he had not convinced me, my interlocutor quickly changed the subject and started to tell me about how the ban on alcohol had inflicted an even greater evil on Iran, namely, drugs. "There has been a terrible upsurge in drug abuse in Iran," he said. "I have to admit that there is one thing in all this that surprises me," he continued, "namely, the fact that the police and the committees are really not doing anything to crack down on drug addicts or drug pushers. To be sure, the sale and use of drugs has not been legalized, but people go on smoking hashish, almost openly."

Later on, when I was paying more attention to this, my curiosity having been aroused by his remarks, I could tell that he was telling me the truth....

[23 Nov 79, p 6]

[Text] Passport Business

Just before the end of our trip through Iran we learned still another very interesting fact, namely, that we could get rich by selling our passports. When foreigners come into the country hardly anyone goes to the trouble of trying to get their travel documents from them. Everyone understands that at this point the only way to get a foreign passport is to steal it. And trying to buy one is out of the question, since passports are indispensable to foreigners while they are in Iran. However, as the time draws near when foreigners are due to leave the country there is a corresponding increase in the number of offers made to them to turn their passports into a big pile of dollars.

On the black market a foreign passport costs around 3,000 dollars. The price depends on how easy it is to use this passport to get into as many countries as possible, especially Western countries, without having to obtain

a visa. For this reason, a Yugoslav passport is by far the most expensive, costing a full 4,000 dollars. This is how much they offered us, waving a wad of greenbacks in front of our noses just in order to persuade us to hand over our passports. They begged, implored and then started to threaten us, but in the end--when they realized they were not getting anywhere--they just swore at us and called us names.

We found out later on that a Yugoslav passport really is the most convenient travel document for Iranian refugees. First of all, because the holder of such a passport can get into neighboring Turkey without a visa and, second, because they can move on from Turkey to any other Western country, also without a visa. Iranians who are on the run could care less whether their residence abroad has anyone's approval, since they will worry about that problem when the time comes. Their first priority now is to get into any other country. The opportunities which a Yugoslav passport affords them in this respect are by far the most wide-ranging.

Regardless of the extent to which we might be proud of the fact that in Iran we are rightly regarded as the freest travelers in the world, under the present circumstances this fact can be not only unpleasant, but also dangerous. Not only because Yugoslavs, as soon as people find out where they come from, are targets of obnoxious passport buyers, which swoop down on you everywhere you go, but also because they are vulnerable to cleaver chieves and pick-pockets who will use every means at their disposal in an effort to "relieve" them of their passports.

A person is not even safe when he has left all these types behind and on the point of leaving Iran is confronted with customs officers and border police. It is utterly unbelievable, but we saw with our own eyes how a party of 16 foreigners, including 2 Yugoslavs, lost all their passports right on the Iranian border. This happened in the town of Tayyebat on the Iran-Afghanistan border.

The police collected the passports of these 16 tourists, who were waiting in line, and told them they they should wait while their passports were being stamped. People who have traveled in this part of the world before are used to having to wait for hours for something like this that is normally taken care of immediately. So they were not alarmed by the fact that the police were gone for a full 2 hours. But there were more than a little flabbergasted when the police came back--without their passports.

"I lost them. Somebody stole them from me while I was in the mosque saying my prayers," said one of the policemen with an innocent smile by way of explanation to the horrified tourists. His excuse was of course utterly ridiculous, but in Iran it is not a good idea to ask Moslems why in the middle of the working day they went to the mosque to say their prayers. Naturally, not everyone does this, not even on a regular basis, but on this occasion this excuse probably seemed as good as any other to the policeman in question.

We soon had a chance to realize for ourselves how very unpleasant it is to be stuck in Iran without passports.

It all started with the fact that absolutely no one, neither the customs officers nor the police, wanted to give these unfortunate people a statement certifying that their passports had been stolen. So their passports were taken away from this almost with official approval.

There then followed an incredible display of abusive treatment, which neither we, fortunately as bystanders, nor these 16 tourists could have expected. The Yugoslavs, who had the most to lose as a result of this entire incident, had an especially hard time.

In the first place, just because they were Yugoslavs, the local laws required that they should be assigned a police escort for the balance of their stay in Iran. This is to be sure not a free service, but rather costs \$250.00 a day. Consequently, they were forced to pay this price. Then they could look forward to a return plane trip to Tehran, again at their own expense, which was by no means cheap. The entire procedure surrounding the issuance of new passports takes about 2 weeks, and during this time these people were forced to pay for their own food and lodging. And Iran really is an expensive place to live, especially these days.

Even though the staff of the Yugoslav Embassy in Iran made a real effort to take care of all this as quickly as possible, feeling as sorry as they did for these unfortunate people, they could not do anything to prevent their bankruptcy. During these 2 weeks, quite unexpectedly and through no fault of their own, two Yugoslavs had to pay out more than \$1,100. Had they known what was in store for them, they would have decided that it would be better to sell their passports to black marketeers for upwards of \$4,000. They then would have been able to get through these 2 weeks of hanging around by spending only one-fourth of the price they received for their passports and could have walked away with the rest.

But, naturally, this idea never occurred to anyone. Instead, the many Yugoslavs in Iran, since they had already heard of this unpleasant incident, held tightly onto their passports, even while the police were stamping them, absolutely refusing to let go of them and hand them over to anyone, even to someone acting in an official capacity. And this is exactly what we did while we had to engage in lengthy debates, first with the customs officials and then with the border police. However, we held our ground, and no one could persuade us to relent, not even with the strongest assurances that everything would be alright.

To be safe means you have to play it safe.

But, thinking back on everything that happened to us during the past month while we were traveling through a closed country like Iran, we realized that, if it exists at all, safety is in fact a very scarce commodity. This is why,

as we were crossing the Iranian-Turkish border at the end of our trip, we flashed smiles of satisfaction at the Turkish customs officers and border police to whom we came running with open arms. They gave us a friendly welcome and nodded their heads in complete understanding.

They slapped us on the back and, without hardly any of the usual formalities, they let us pass on into Turkish territory.

11813

CSO: 2800

TASK OF NEW FINANCE MINISTER ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Nov 79 p 13

[Article by Avraham Tal: "Will He Redeem the Economy: Health of the Economy--Not Wealth of the Country Is the Proper Goal for the Government and the new Finance Minister"]

[Text] The outgoing Finance Minister, Mr Simcha Ehrlich has said this week that "he has no strength left to pull," and therefore it is difficult to reproach him. Without entering into a discussion at this time as to the virtues and shortcomings of the horse--we must acknowledge that the wagon is overloaded beyond logical constraints; the path is rocky, misdirected, leading nowhere. And as if this were not enough, look at the passengers: instead of getting down to help the weary horse, from atop the wagon they throw sticks between the spokes of the wheels. This is a rather faithful picture of the situation, from which the incoming finance minister may draw up three headings for his economic plan: to unload the excess cargo, to change course, and to restrain the passengers.

The excess load is first and foremost in the area of public expenditures. If this were not the principal source of our economic woes (as it is held to be by all economists almost without exception), it would be exhausting to continually return to this point time and again: there can be no economic rehabilitation without real reduction in government spending, by the local authorities and the rest of the public institutions. On the methodological plane one needs to add that the correctness of a statement is not diminished simply because it has been repeated ad nauseum or because it has never been tried. Public expenditures have risen yearly in real terms even beyond the growth of the population.

A reduction in public spending will bring about not only a lessening of inflationary pressure on the part of demands, but also an increase in deflationary pressure on the part of supply. When the public sector acquires fewer manpower and merchandise services, signs of weakening are likely to appear (because of the size of public demand) in the suppliers of services--the business sector and home economy (from which we enlist governmental and domestic servants).

There is no chance of combatting inflation successfully, turning a larger portion of economic resources to export, without significant moderation in economic activity, in the conduct of which--and only in whose conduct--it is possible to bring about changes in areas of emphasis. The direction is--regretfully and painfully--deliberalization. Mr Ehrlich had stated at the time of the overturn in government 2 years ago, that he "had placed his political future in the balance" with the direction of his liberalization program for foreign currency. He has failed and paid a costly political price; now it would be absurd if the system that was one of the causes of failure should remain in effect. A liberalization of foreign currency--like liberalization in any area, while safeguarding a guaranteed minimum for the individual as well as the essential public interests--is a desirable objective, but is impossible to fulfill under any condition between today and tomorrow.

Mr Ehrlich, not understanding this, stated at the inception of the economic overturn in 1977: "Tomorrow let my decision to change the existing system be adopted." What is required are suitable preparations, complementary accompanying measures, and principally--reasonable assurance that these accompanying measures will be taken and put into action. But one of these basic conditions was not fulfilled in 1977; liberalization gave freedom of action to a cripple--a creature that was not capable of getting up to walk on its own, and certainly not along a straight path. Crutches were prepared for the cripple (in the form of restraints on the import of capital and the systematic intervention of Bank Israel in regulating exchange rates) but the principal crippling defects remained in evidence.

Mr Ehrlich's economic policy subsequently collapsed and not inconsiderably. In the present condition in which the cripple continues to roam unchecked in regions pregnant with great and numerous dangers, foreign currency is becoming a legal transient in the economy, monetary control is wrested from the hands of Bank Israel, the economy is liable to be ruined by an excess of foreign currency, and import is encouraged while export is not preferred. What is required then is a change in direction of the trend to neutralize explosives, and first and foremost, rate(s) of exchange need to be returned to the armories of each economic policy, not indefinitely, but only until conditions are created which will bring about Mr Ehrlich's liberal vision with relative assurance.

Those passengers who need to be restrained are, above all, passengers of the upper echelons: ministers, and principally the ministers who spend and/or squander money (this demonstrates the well-known double entendre of the English expression "spending ministers"). The minister of education believes that if the economy is fated to collapse, it should at least collapse with a superb educational system, from age zero (as we have heard this week with a heart full of trepidation) until old age (adult education); the minister of relief will not permit the State of Israel to enter bankruptcy without ensuring minimum subsistence plus a pension law, and so forth--David Levy, Snustik, etc.

How will the future minister of finance teach these ministers to match their elevated expectations to the gray reality--this is a puzzle; possibly our experience in rescuing industries from bankruptcy (something that cannot be done without reeducating managers and employees) is a necessary condition which ought to be given high priority in the "job description," even if we are not speaking about Mr Horovitz. The issue of reeducation does not end at the ministerial level. The professional organizations, directors of businesses, the various economic pressure groups, the public at large--yes, even you and I--everyone will have to tighten his belt, for a two-fold purpose: a) in order to lighten the load and b) in order to travel a windy road with its changes in direction, until the wagon can return to an orderly path.

The reduction in the annual inflationary rate from 100 percent plus to 30 percent minus (how modest is the level of aspiration to which we have degenerated during the 2 and a half years of Ehrlich's regime!) and a reduction in the balance of payments deficit from 4-5 billion dollars to 2-3 billion (as above)--these are tasks whose minimum period of realization, under optimal conditions, is 2-3 years. The meaning of optimal conditions is a proper finance minister, a stable, supportive government (such as is ready to approve the establishment of a reduced ministerial committee for economic affairs possessing broad (but not unlimited or unchecked) authority, a more or less disciplined public, and stability--at least relative--vis-a-vis external factors. Even a financial wizard would not be able to execute this task in less time, a fact which sets before the Likud government an enticing choice: whether to accept defeat in the 20th Knesset elections at the end of 1981, in the wake of public anger because of a salutary but painful policy that will have been forced on them by then (we will ignore the other possible causes of a political overthrow); or whether to lose the elections because of an economic crisis, which would be totally unavoidable during 1980-81 if Ehrlich's economic system persists.

Unfortunately, in this instance, life is not structured in terms of black and white and therefore even a third possibility may be possible: a few repairs in order to correct a few faults, some patches on the most dangerous tears; ad-hoc measures to prevent imminent collapse--and no more. Liable to elect the third possibility are politicians and parties in whom beat the drive for political survival, in itself equal at least--"at least" being used exceedingly carefully--to the national sense of responsibility for the monetary strength of the economy.

Which of the three paths will Mr Horovitz take if the terms of employment between him and Mr Begin and the needs of the factions of the coalition are decided? We know, we know, and even Mr Begin knows that there is no point in getting rid of Ehrlich in order to replace him with Horovitz. Regarding the system of patching up tears, somehow this matter doesn't jibe with the public image of the man, who until now has managed to arouse in the public an impression built on experience, that there are several matters that, in their eyes, are yet more important than a ministerial portfolio or a political career all together. Among these matters--the strength of the national economy, to our joy, and the integrity of the country, to our sorrow.

What is to be done? It is impossible to order up ministers according to recipe, and Mr Hurvitz has come to us as he is. But we can help ourselves and him as well if we point out from time to time that we will not call upon the Cabinet to defend the integrity of the country (there are more than enough defenders of the walls without them) but rather to defend the integrity of the economy.

9384

CSO: 4805

GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH PALESTINE ORGANIZATION REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 21 Dec 79 p 14

/Article by Ghanim Zurayqat: "What Is Going On Between Jordan and the Resistance?"/

/Text/ Yasir 'Arafat reached Amman, as had been expected, without media tumult or press musings over the site of the meeting and the issues to be discussed in it. The man was received in Amman by King Husayn and stayed as Jordan's official guest, in the guest palace specifically.

On the horizon one big question mark presented itself: would the meeting come up with a solution to the problem of the committee on the fund for supporting the perseverance of the inhabitants of the occupied territories, now that the resistance has unilaterally announced a freeze on that committee? The detachments of the resistance had embraced various schools of thought in their analysis of the dimensions of the freeze on the fund, supporting themselves by the nature of their stand on Jordan and basically the principle of Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue. The actual nature of the dispute in essence did not concern the distribution of certain subsidies to municipality heads. Each party is operating in its own way in the occupied territories and has the ability to move to procure the funds it requires from one source or another.

The actual nature of the problem in Jordanian-Palestinian relations, rather, is considered one of the most delicate and conspicuous problems of peace in the Middle East. They are relations which always combine calm and stormy weather at the same time. The joint committees meet over tables and at sessions without moving a step forward. The Palestinians demand that their political detainees be released while Jordan says that they belong to political parties opposed to the kingdom, are Jordanian citizens first of all and have Jordanian citizenship.

Since the Baghdad summit last year and the consecration of the Jordanian-Palestinian "reconciliation" at the Tunis summit under the slogan of "an alternate Arab plan to the Camp David summit," each of the top parties, Jordan and the resistance, has been trying to budge the other from its

position. Amman is trying to win a new Arab position through the plan for a solution King Husayn had previously presented (the United Kingdom plan), which met with American-Israeli approval. It was in this context that the Jordanian minister Sa'id al-Tall said, after the first Jordanian-Palestinian meeting, "The best formulation for a solution to the Palestinian issue lies in implementation of the United Arab Kingdom plan, which King Husayn set forth in 1972. This plan, which unifies the east and west banks of the Jordan River in a federal union, still exists because it is the appropriate formula for regulating the affairs of the united family."

This official statement was not directed to the Arab governments alone, but also to the Palestinian resistance, which had rejected the plan when King Husayn himself announced it.

The resistance wants Jordan to stiffen its position regarding Camp David and the autonomy plan, and it wants Jordan not to deviate from the unanimity of Arab summit resolutions at a time when they call for adherence to the slogan of "an independent Palestinian state."

However, what has happened in the corridors--news of which has leaked out, making things clearer--is that it is some prominent figures on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip playing a dual role with Jordan and the Palestinian resistance who are promoting the continued dialogue, stressing that it is not impossible that the Likud bloc governing Israel may depart from power soon and that the Israeli Labor Party will come in and play its part in the next stage of the "peace" process. These prominent figures have promises and guarantees that the proposed autonomy project will go through a "cosmetic process" so that it will be more compatible with "Palestinian aspirations" and give King Husayn a greater role in the peace plans for the area.

In the light of these circumstances, discussion on an "alternate Arab plan" to Camp David which in essence will not deviate from the United Arab Kingdom peace plan is taking place openly in Jordan.

In spite of all these contradictions, the dialogue goes on, in anticipation of the departure of Begin and the start of a new stage.

11887
CSO: 4802

NATION'S BUDGET FOR 1980 SUMMARIZED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 6 Dec 79 p 6

/Article: "Draft Jordanian General Budget Law: Arab Aid Will Remain As Is While American Aid Will Decline"/

/Text/ The Jordanian minister of finance, Mr Muhammad al-Dabbas, presented the Jordanian National Consultative Council with the draft law for the general budget of the current year, 1980. The Jordanian National Council has transferred the draft law to the Financial Committee for study and discussion, to offer recommendations on it. Here are the most important points on which next year's budget has concentrated:

1. Continued improvement of Jordanian armed forces capability.
2. Continued development effort on guidance from the development plan in the light of new requirements.
3. Absorption of a portion of the burden of a rise in the prices of food-stuffs and energy on citizens.
4. Improvement of services the government provides in the fields of water, education, health, care, communications and transportation.
5. Attention to independent organizations which participate with agencies of a government character in providing services or establishing projects.
6. Continued provision of the wherewithal for perseverance to the occupied territories and the means for a dignified life for those who have left.
7. Increased budget reliance on local revenues to cover different aspects of current spending.

Studying the general budget for next year, we find among its most important features:

1. The new budget for the coming year totals 529 million Jordanian dinars, an increase of 16 million Jordanian dinars over last year. In practice this represents a process of stifling inflation, as a consequence of the drop in expenditures.

2. The Jordanian government has estimated that next year's revenues will total 208.6 million Jordanian dinars, an increase of 18.2 percent over 1979; these revenues will cover 69.3 percent of estimated current expenditures.

This trend means the following:

A. There is an improvement, in that all current expenditures will be covered by local revenues.

B. An increase in exports through the encouragement of local industrial and agricultural output.

C. An increase in imports.

Through this, the Jordanian government has anticipated that Arab aid will stay at its 1979 level, although American aid will drop from 9 to 6 million Jordanian dinars. This is the final period of this aid.

3. Expenditures for 1980 have been estimated at 301.3 million Jordanian dinars, an increase of 9.8 million dinars over last year, 1979--that is, an increase of 3.3 percent. In estimating current expenditures, attention has been given to reducing current spending to a minimum, with the objective of reducing the reliance on foreign aid in these expenditures, of increasing reliance on local revenues, and of limiting inflation. In addition, a large portion of expenditures has been oriented toward fuel and supply commodity subsidies and to such indirect subsidies as universities, hospitals, municipalities, the Cooperative Organization, specialized lending institutions, societies, and refugee aid.

As regards development expenditures, the Jordanian government has determined not to reduce the value of the estimated capital spending for 1980 below its 1979 level; the estimated expenditures for 1980 total 227.9 million Jordanian dinars, an increase of 23.8 million dinars over the previous year, 1979; this has been given to development projects, and represents 11.7 percent. Among the most important capital projects set out in the budget are:

A. In the production sector:

The government has sustained the level of its commitments toward the fertilizer and potassium projects. Participation in the capital of the Cooperative Organization and the Agricultural Lending Organization will also

increase, as will implementation of the Jordan Valley Authority projects, and the Ministry of Agriculture will devote attention to producing improved seeds, forestation, and agricultural service performance improvement.

The government will also continue completing studies on construction of the al-Mugarin Dam. The Jordanian government has also been interested in particular in devising local energy substitutes by carrying out practical studies on oil shale and shale uses in industry and electric power generation.

B. In the Potable Water Sector:

The budget includes additional allocations to the Potable Water Organization. The organization's budget has risen from 2.5 million Jordanian dinars in 1979 to 5,284,000 dinars, an increase of 111 percent. There is also a project to pipe al-Azraq water to Amman at a cost of 9 million dinars.

C. The Housing Sector:

Two million Jordanian dinars have been allocated to the Housing Organization, and the Jordanian government is trying to finance the Abu Nusayr City project. The government is continuing to give the Housing Organization banking facilities from the Central Bank and the Housing Bank.

D. The Communications Sector:

Next year the Communications Organization will provide about 31,000 new telephone numbers, and there will be an expansion in telex services. There will be an improvement in the systems in the towns and rural areas and there will be an improvement in domestic and international dialling.

E. The Independent Organizations Sector:

The government offers annual aid which in 1979 totalled 16 million dinars to such independent organizations as the Electric Authority, the Port Organization, the railways, Alia, the Geographic Center, the Water and Sewer Authority, the free zones and public transportation. These are the most important aspects of the new Jordanian government budget for 1980, which comprises a deficit estimated at 25 million dinars which is expected to be covered by development bonds. There is a further uncovered deficit totalling 9,233,000 Jordanian dinars which has been placed under the article "Additional Aid". That is, the total covered and uncovered deficit comes to 34,233,000 Jordanian dinars. This figure is close to the subsidies being offered for fuel and supplies. The deficit for last year, which will be carried forward to 1980, came to a total of 81.5 million dinars.

11887

CSO: 4802

OFFICIAL MONITORING OF TELEPHONES DEPLORED

Beirut AL-NIDA' AL-USBU'I in Arabic 18 Nov 79 pp 4,5

[Article by Tariq al-'Amili: "The Deuxieme Bureau Is Attempting To Count the Breaths of Lebanese Preparatory To Imposing the American Solutions and Fascist Schemes"]

[Text] A warning against the danger of a military dictatorship is not just a general political heading, but rather a complete and detailed dossier which must be read page by page with great care. The page concerning the rebuilding of the army must be read carefully so that we know what kind of army is being built. We must use a magnifying glass to find out what is hidden between the lines on the page pertaining to the Deuxieme Bureau, which is reverting to new-old methods. Many pages must be read, and this is the duty of all democratic nationalists who are dedicated to the thing which justifies the existence of their nation, freedom.

The Author of the Script Is American

All the details indicate that the head of the administration is proceeding with a plan for a solution to settle the crisis for which America has written the script. Because the plan is American, we must realize that since the post-World War II era, the Americans have not made any substantial changes in the settlement plans which they voluntarily undertake for their allies, supporters and friends in the world--especially in the Third World. Thus, we are seeing scenes unfold which bear a considerable resemblance to the scenes we witnessed with the American settlement plans for Greece, Chile, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and a large collection of states scattered from Latin America to the remotest parts of the East. But despite the fact that America continues to water the seeds of dictatorship, the scythes of the peoples have begun to mow down what these seeds have produced.

Sorry, They Cut Us Off!

Let's read together part of the old but new page which we have heard about before and is confronting us again today. It begins with this scene: Hello, John Doe?

--Yes.

--What's your opinion about the amendment of the new defense law?

--All my previous expectations turned out to be true. They reject the new defense law, and are determined--click...click...click...(The call has been cut off. Another attempt is made to complete the call, and is successful. The conversation continues:)

--Sorry, we were cut off.

--You mean they cut us off. I want to tell you that in spite of my affection for the president of the republic, I think that he is a weak person who is surrounded by people...who are seeking to silence me in all sorts of ways. But I will not keep quiet, and time will show us the evil outcomes of their actions. (The conversation ends.)

This is a sampling from innumerable daily transcripts which are not imaginary in any respect. The familiar heading under which these transcriptions fall is: spying on the citizens by telephone!

The Era of Lists [of opponents and possible opponents], Names and Espionage

Once again, Lebanese are entering an era of lists containing names upon names of people whose every word must be memorized by heart. In fact, intervention in the conversations of these persons and the use of various forms of interference to stop these conversations are to be used if the "monitor" does not see any benefit in recording them!

This resembles a police story, does it not? However, this is not merely a case of resemblance, but one of basic detailedness taken from the police system which is now in the process of being set up.

How is this espionage operation being accomplished? We leave the answer to be supplied by some details which have become available to us and which we submit to the responsible officials for verification--especially since some of these officials have been subjected to this operation in turn.

To the Secret Room in Badaru Central

The telephone espionage center is Badaru central--or to be exact, it is located in a room which is closed to the central exchange's regular employees.

On 19 October of last year, the Political Council of the city of Beirut raised these questions: "How is the monitoring of telephones accomplished, on whom is it carried out, and who does the monitoring? Why was the monitoring equipment moved from the main exchange on Riyadh al-Sulh Street to the Badaru exchange?"

However, these questions remain unanswered for the officials to this day.

Information sources say that the decision to use the Badaru exchange to monitor telephone communications was made during the period following the intensification of the first stage of the crisis, which lasted 2 years. For this purpose, a special wing of the Badaru exchange was set aside. This wing was furnished with modern equipment which was operated by employees from General Security and the Deuxieme Bureau.

The technical reasons for choosing the Badaru central exchange to play this role stem from the fact that the exchange is centrally located with respect to the other telephone exchanges in the capital, the suburbs and the other districts. All of the exchanges are linked with each other by cables, which are called trunk cables.

Exposing the Deuxieme Bureau

Based on instructions issued by the Deuxieme Bureau or General Security, the order is given to one of the telephone exchanges to transfer a specified telephone line belonging to a person who is to be monitored from the main cable to the trunk cable connected with Badaru exchange.

In order to facilitate this exchange's role of carrying out its operations in the most thorough manner, its capability to allocate lines is being expanded. It is now the second largest exchange in the country following the main exchange, Riyadh al-Sala. The lines extending from the exchange now number around 20, 000! One of these lines leads to the residence of Prime Minister Salim al-Huss himself.

Moreover, concern to put the telephone exchanges back into operation while they were shut down for various reasons was directed at the Badaru exchange above all others. When the crisis of interrupted telephone service intensified during the last days in office of the former minister, Farid Rufayil, the general director of the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Rimi Siani, announced: "The telephone administration did not stop working a single day," he added; "when the Badaru, al-Hazimiyah and al-Ashrafiyah exchanges stopped working because of some hits and the disruption of telephone service, [word missing] to secure Badaru exchange in 2 hours, al-Hazimiyah in 4 hours, and al-Ashrafiyah after 36 hours."

Of course, even 2 hours may have been a very long time for the Badaru exchange, since the "monitors" sitting in the secret room missed the chance to bag some fresh telephone messages!

Clove Link With Information System

What is in the secret room? Aside from the human element, of course, informed sources say that after much difficulty they learned that the equipment used to monitor phone calls has evolved since the 1960's. This equipment relies primarily on an electronic brain which regulates the monitoring operation and the sending of automatic commands to a large group of recorders to switch them on at the proper time.

The use of the computer brings to an end the long era of primitive devices which relied on the installation of "plugs" on telephone lines which were to be monitored. Such devices meant that a person was needed for each line to be monitored.

Parliamentary circles concerned about this matter furnish additional information which is also of the greatest importance. These circles say they have learned that the monitoring equipment which relies on the computer simultaneously performs an extremely complicated task. This task is based on "feeding" the electronic brain the vocal patterns of a specified person who is the focus of great interest and who is to be monitored wherever he goes. As soon as the computer receives the vocal patterns, it becomes capable of picking out all the telephone conversations carried on by the monitored individual from any location. Thus, the process is no longer restricted to a single telephone line but rather to a voice, and this provides ample opportunity to carry on a maximum level of espionage.

There is a "blood" relationship between the communications computer and the information computer. They both are a part of the same plan, which is to surrender the country to American intelligence. To clarify the relationship, we might mention that the infamous information project, which puts all the details, whatever they may be, into the electronic archives of the Deuxieme Bureau, relies primarily on the automatic brain which operates according to an American system carefully set up by a company which is under the CIA. When this project first came under discussion, it was revealed that the minister under whose jurisdiction the project fell was in fact [former] Minister of Justice Farid Rulayil, who is closely connected with a group of American companies which work in this field. Recently there have been frequent reports that Rulayil also has a close relationship with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, whose net income of over \$5.25 billion this year places it first among the various American companies. This company's name has become synonymous with the major plots which the American CIA has hatched throughout the world, of which we might mention the bloody revolution in Chile as just one example.

The Deuxieme Bureau does not have the resources by itself to endeavor to obtain the complicated equipment used to spy on the citizens of Lebanon, if only because the process of operating and maintaining such equipment requires a technical organization which is as skilled as the equipment is complex in order to keep the system in working order.

This defines the characteristics of the questions that are being asked more and more about the nature of the equipment which America is putting at the service of the plan for the "reconstruction of the state," which is evidently a plan to put the Lebanese in a big prison!

In the context of the information plan, informed sources confirm that dangers continue to exist because efforts are still being made to carry this suspicious plan through.

Despite the fact that the plan was not approved in Parliament, the operations to send people abroad for training in the operation of the equipment used in the project has continued. The aforementioned sources possess a list containing the names of persons who have been detached to the United States and France in particular to take the necessary training courses, which last about 15 months on the average.

This is to make no mention of the millions of pounds which are spent for this purpose with the knowledge of the Cabinet from time to time.

More Than RUFAYIL!

These sources go on to say that the most dangerous thing about this affair is that there are numerous "Rufayils" ensconced in positions of authority who continue to contemplate a palliative formula for carrying the project through in order to defend the principle of a total information center from individuals and organizations!

The Constitution and Laws Do Not Permit Monitoring

We return to the issue of telephone espionage to pose this pressing question: What immediate measures can be taken to obviate the dangers of this dreadful mandate over the Lebanese?

Circles within the Parliamentary Committee for Telegraph, Post and Telephone react to this news with alarm. They say that there is no provision in the constitution, laws or regulations of Lebanon which permits espionage operations via the telephone. Only the executive authorities can carry out such monitoring, and then only following a declaration of a state of emergency in the country. For such a declaration to be made, a law must be issued, and this law must be ratified by Parliament.

These circles go on to say: "Neither the Deuxieme Bureau nor General Security have the right to conduct this operation. Furthermore, they cannot bypass the responsible minister, who is the minister of telephone, in giving orders to the telephone exchanges to transfer certain individuals' lines to the Badaru exchange from other exchanges."

They add: "There are extremely limited circumstances under which the organizations resort to pursuit of a limited number of individuals, but they cannot reach such a large number of people."

The sources conclude: "For the issue to be raised on the parliamentary level, a dossier containing all the material evidence which can be obtained in this matter must be prepared, or at the very least those persons who know their lines are being subjected to monitoring must take the initiative to bring the issue before the public."

As we have said from the beginning, the issue has been laid on the table, and we do not know how long the process of confronting it in earnest will take. On this point, parliamentary circles which were active when the telephone monitoring issue was raised in the early 1970's say that it might take a long time to expose these scandalous acts if we handle things the way we handled the dossier on the Deuxieme Bureau during its first powerful phase, which lasted from the early 1960's to the early 1970's. During this period, many people knew the story about the monitoring but chose to remain silent--either because they were acting in collusion with the Deuxieme Bureau or because they were blameworthy--until the bureau became lax and everyone was in a position to take the initiative to hang out some of the organization's dirty linen.

Once With Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam

On 14 November 1970, Prime Minister Salam visited the center for spying on phone conversations on the fourth floor of the post and telephone building. During this visit, Salam stumbled upon the report on the [telephone] surveillance in which the monitors wrote down the telephone conversations, including particular details and the subjects which were covered.

Among these reports was one on a telephone call which took place in Salam's own home, and another on two calls made by former Representative Nihad Buwayz--one at the house of Mahmud al-Sana and the other at the house of Major General Michel Nawfal--about dangers in the Kasrawan area. Salam also stumbled upon a list of people whose lines had been put under constant surveillance. These lists change every day, and from time to time the names of additional people whose calls are to be monitored are added to the list.

These stories were spread at the time, and the individuals who related them did so while they were in positions of authority, since Salam was prime minister at that time and his deputy, Jamil Kibbi, was minister of telegraph, post and telephone.

But as for the stories which have not yet been made public, the parliamentary sources state that the issue of the monitoring of telephone calls was only raised in two parliamentary sessions during 1970. The searches which were made of the monitoring center were mere formalities. They led to the closing of the center "on a pledge from a center official," but in fact all the center's equipment and records were subsequently moved to the new site in Badaru, where the center now sits in security thanks to the isolationist parties which have always coexisted with suppressive measures and the restriction of freedoms.

Scandal Equal to the Monitoring Scandal in France

The issue must be raised to the level of a scandal in order to obviate its dangers--which reach the overwhelming majority of Lebanese--before it is too late. For as this article is being published, there are numerous telephone lines belonging to representatives, officials, party leaders, heads of newspapers, thinkers, union leaders, and dozens of active members of their society

which are being monitored. This issue must become a scandal of the same proportions as the telephone monitoring scandal which occurred in France in 1975 when the newspaper CANARD ENCHAINEE discovered that not only were its telephone lines monitored but there were secret listening devices in the editors' meeting room. Minister of Interior Poniatowski had no choice but to try to invent justifications based on the law. But the issue increased in intensity, and it became evident that many heads would have to be knocked together. At that time, a series of laws was issued which prohibited any form of telephone monitoring except in very restricted circumstances, and even then such operations would have to be supervised by a committee made up of individuals of proven integrity.

The issue is the protection of freedoms. Thus, observers feel that something like a race in time is taking place between the plan to surrender Lebanon to the claws of a police system and the effort to return it to an atmosphere of democracy. This race may be completed in as short a time as 3 years.

We still have some details which reveal that every means will be employed to reach the goal of turning Lebanon into a police state.

These means include commissioning organizations in the private sector to function as "information banks," i.e., centers specializing in espionage which buy and sell information. These organizations are attempting to work in nationalist areas in particular.

Observers do not rule out anything which has been mentioned in the context of the plan for a military dictatorship for Lebanon so long as the administration is headed by an individual who has not yet taken matters firmly in hand by embracing the clear alternative of democracy.

In this matter, history is repeating itself. For intelligence organizations always scale the wall of the weak regime.

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WATER RESOURCES STUDIED, FULL UTILIZATION URGED

Tripoli AL-THAQAFAH AL-'ARABIYAH in Arabic Nov 79 pp 56-63

[Article by Dr Mahmud al-Salawi: "Water Resources in Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya"]

[Text] The Arab homeland covers a vast area and encompasses nearly 27 latitudinal degrees. Therefore, the Arab homeland's climate varies greatly, considering that the northern parts of this homeland fall within the moderate zones whereas the southern parts fall within the semi-tropical zone. Most of the Arab homeland falls within the desert region which is poor in both flora and fauna. Despite this, the possibility of transforming a large part of this homeland into cultivable land is an indubitably certain possibility, if the water necessary and suitable for such transformation is found. The cultivated area in the Arab homeland is estimated at 105 million feddans or nearly 3 percent of the world's total cultivated area.

There are still vast areas in the Arab homeland capable of producing but not cultivated yet. This heralds the possibility of increasing the Arab homeland's population, provided that efforts are exerted to distribute this population in a manner compatible with the agricultural resources and to exploit the cultivable lands.

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is one of the Arab homeland's countries most of whose territories are located in a desert region characterized by the lack of water. This is why water has been and continues to be the fundamental factor determining horizontal agricultural expansion. Because most of the Jamahiriya's territories are located in an area characterized by little rainfall and a high degree of evaporation, the lands are often exposed to problems similar to those of the other Arab countries, as well as others, that suffer from the lack of rainfall and the same climatic conditions prevailing in our area. This is why it is necessary for water studies to receive a high degree of the attention of these countries. In this regard, the Jamahiriya is exerting utmost efforts and spending large sums of money to facilitate such studies and to enhance and develop them to the highest required level. Within this framework, we find increasing and active interest in the following:

Studying surface and underground water resources, determining the quantity and distribution of these waters, building dams and other projects to exploit flood waters and running surface waters.

Devoting attention to setting up and developing irrigation projects.

Regulating the exploitation of underground water and issuing laws to protect these resources against decline and depletion and to preserve them as a strategic national wealth.

Devoting attention to setting up and developing drainage projects so that reclaimed lands may not turn into saline lands.

Surveying and classifying reclaimable and cultivable lands in which expansion is to take place, provided that the necessary water resources are available for cultivating and irrigating these lands.

Devoting attention to afforestation and building terraces, bridges and windbreakers and regulating ploughing and other activities to fight erosion of soil by water and wind in the areas of the Jamahiriya that are exposed to such problems and to protect soil and water against waste and loss.

Devoting attention to the desalination of sea water for drinking and irrigation purposes, conducting studies to get water from artificial rain and re-using the sewerage water produced by cities for irrigating agricultural projects, such as al-Hadabah al-Khadra' [Green Plateau] project, for example.

Water sources in the Arab homeland are comprised of rain water, river water and underground water. While there are flood areas where permanent rivers run, such as Sudan, Egypt and Iraq, there are other vast areas in the Arab homeland that depend on rain water and underground water, as in the Jamahiriya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE, the Gulf area and other Arab countries.

We will try in this article to shed some light, little as it may be, on the water resources in some Arab countries. Let us start with the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

The area of the Jamahiriya is nearly 175,954 hectares. Libya extends between altitudes 20 degrees to 32 degrees north and longitudes 25 degrees to 10 degrees east. It is bordered by the Arab Republic of Egypt and Sudan from the southeast, the Mediterranean Sea from the north, Tunisia and Algeria from the west, the Niger Republic and Chad from the south. According to contours, climate, the flora and the water resources, the Jamahiriya can be divided into the following three parts: The western part, the eastern part and the southwestern and southeastern part.

The western part comprises the western Jamahiriya and is characterized by the presence of the Naffusah or Tripoli mountain range (al-Jabal al-Gharbi). Broad and even plains, known by the name of al-Jifarah plain, are located between this mountain range and the Mediterranean coast. Extending along the coast are sand dunes consisting of continental and marine sediments and interspersed by depressions filled by lakes and saline marshes. The land adjacent to the coast is calcareous and sandy land whereas the land behind the coastal marshes is saline land. The rainfall in this area, in the winter, amounts to an average of 350 millimeters annually near Tripoli. This average is higher near the mountain ridge and lower south of the mountain. All the rain may fall over this area within a short period, i.e. over several days. Nearly one half the Jamahiriya's population is concentrated in this area. In the area of al-Hamadah al-Hamra and west of the Surt Basin, the average annual rainfall is less than 50 millimeters. The hydrographic network, i.e. the natural river [sic] disposal area of the Naffusah mountain range, is the only rain disposal network in this area. It is the network that carries a large part of the running water in the area and of the rain water that remains after seepage. When we discuss the volume of the running water after rainfall in the various valleys and over a distance of more than 20 kilometers in al-Jifarah plain, we find that the average annual flow of surface water along the southern and western ridges of Naffusah mountain amounts to 30-50 million cubic meters of water a year. The Jamahiriya is currently conducting extensive studies to exploit this surface water and to prevent its wasteful termination in the sea. The Jamahiriya is doing this by conducting studies on the valleys so as to build dams and reservoirs on them. The best example of this is the Wadi [valley] Ki'am dam which retains 10 million cubic meters of running surface water every year and which has a storage capacity of 100 million cubic meters. There is also the Wadi al-Mujaynin dam which prevents the loss of nearly 14 million cubic meters of running surface water annually and which has a storage capacity of 58 million cubic meters. Many other dams are currently either under study or implementation, such as the dams of al-Habarah area on the valleys of Al-Rumman, al-Sawwakh, Abu-'A'ishah, Abu-Shaybah, Lubdah and Suq al-Khamis. These dam projects are meant to control the running surface water and not to let it flow wastefully to the sea so that it may be exploited to irrigate the major agricultural projects in the areas of al-Jifarah plain, al-Sulul al-Khudr and Wadi Zawzan, in addition to protecting the city of Tripoli, the town of Ibn Ghashir and other towns from the danger of floods that destroy the land and the crops in the areas they hit. The dams are also meant to refresh the underground water reservoirs existing in these areas.

Underground water in this part of the Jamahiriya is of utmost importance because it is the main source for all water uses in this most vital and active part of the Jamahiriya. The various agricultural, industrial and population activities in this area affect the volume and quality of the underground water stored here, especially drinking water and water used for agriculture. The Secretariat of Dams (and Water Resources, now the Water Resources and Soil Authority) has devoted since its creation an enormous part of its resources and activities to studying the deep and

close-to-surface underground resources in this part of the Jamahiriyah. The authority has faced numerous problems connected with this vital sector, namely the water resources sector, and has exerted utmost efforts to solve these problems or to find solutions for them so as to preserve this strategic and vital resource in this part of the country. The authority is still conducting research and studies and exerting scientific and practical efforts to study the current and future water situation in this area, to overcome the present problems and to prevent the emergence of water problems in the future.

Geologically, al-Jifarah plain can be divided into two main parts:

The northern part--north of al-'Aziziyah--which consists of thick sandy and calcareous layers infused with clay.

The southern part located between al-'Aziziyah longitude [sic] and Naffusah mountain which consists of thin layers of the quaternary period covering rocks of the Jurassic period, comprised mainly of a combination of sand, clay and dolomite rocks.

Insofar as underground water reservoirs are concerned, al-Jifarah plain has various levels of underground water. The water volume, depth and quality varies from one level to another and from one reservoir to another. The layers formed in the quaternary period contain two levels. The first level is close to the surface and has been exploited extensively near the coast. The exploitation of this water started on the hands of the Arab farmers who used the water to irrigate their small coastal oasis farms a long time ago. The level of this water ranges from 15.5 meters under the surface in the area of Tripoli city to more than 10 meters in the west. The level gets deeper toward the center and the east where it reaches 20 meters. In any case, the underground water level in the area is not regular. While it is close to the ground surface near Sawani Ibn Adam, it reaches a depth of 50-100 meters in the eastern parts of the mountain. The water flows slowly in the west. It has also been found that some rocks contain salt and the water is, therefore, saline. In the east, the water stores are interspersed by layers of dry clay and the water flows rapidly, thus turning fresh. There are faulty formations in the base rocks dating back to the miocene, and even the (oligocene), epoch and these faults have caused the presence of fissures southeast of al-'Aziziyah that make the water flow southward instead of northward.

Water wells at this level are found in abundance in the area between Tajura' and Tripoli and the average yield of a well is 13.5-15 cubic meters per hour. The exploitation of this level of underground water is low in the east because of the depth of the water and in the west because of its salinity, as in the case of Zaltan and Bu Kammash. If exploited properly, the yield per well can be doubled, as has happened in Ibn Ghashir area.

The second water level in the formations of the quaternary period is the most important source of underground water in al-Jifarah plain. This level lies 20-25 meters below the abovementioned level and consists of sand and gravel. It is 15-40 meters thick. Under hydraulic pressure, the waters of this level may rise to reach the first level. This makes it likely that they constitute a single level hydraulically, separated at times by layers of dry clay. When these layers are present, they lead to the emergence of two water levels, as is the case in al-'Aziziyah and Suq al-Sabt. In Zanzur and (al-Sawani), the separating layer disappears and the two levels merge. The water yield of this level is good and ranges from 100-150 cubic meters per well per hour. However, the yield may amount to 300 cubic meters per hour. This level supplies a part of the water needs of the city of Tripoli.

The formations of the tertiary period belong to the miocene age and include two levels: The upper level comprised of calcareous and clay rock from the (turonic) age and this level is less important than the (turonic) level generally. [sic]

The second, and more important, level is the deeper level whose waters are found in layers of sand rocks and gravel from the (recent) era. The two miocene levels are separated by a layer of clay and calcareous deposits. The layers containing the water are inclined in a northwesterly direction where the water sinks deeper and forms artesian wells. While the first level is at a depth of 250 meters below ground surface, the second level is as deep as 600 meters west of the city of Tripoli. But when artesian wells are drilled in the area, the water rises to a depth of 23 meters under ground surface and the second rises to sea level [sic]. Yield from the second water level is considered abundant and ranges from 20-50 cubic meters per hour [per well]. If deep water pumps are used, the yield per well may rise to 100-200 cubic meters per hour.

The second level water is more saline than the first, or higher, level water generally and is not fit for the cultivation of many kinds of crops, such as peanuts, wheat and vegetables. However, this water has been proven suitable for the irrigation of other crops, such as citrus fruits and clover.

To sum up, the most important independent level at present is higher level of the quaternary period, located along the coastal strip. The water of this level dries up quickly and becomes more saline the more it is exploited. The most important level containing abundant and good-quality water is the second, or lower, level of the formations of the quaternary period. The present and future importance of this level escalates the deeper you move eastward and toward the center.

The salinity and high temperature of the waters of the two levels of the tertiary period preclude the use of this water for irrigation. However, this water can be still used by mixing it with fresh water and then selecting the right crops and soil for the expanded use of this mixture, in

addition to providing the drainage means. The water can be cooled in basins before being used for this purpose.

As for the fear of depletion of the water resources, this is due to the ill distribution of wells and the failure of the consumption to take the local supply sources into consideration. The large consumption exceeding the supply capacity of the water stored in the formations of the quaternary period may lead to a steep drop in the water level of the wells, thus causing the saline sea water to mix with the fresh underground water. It is established scientifically that the volume of water consumed should not exceed the volume of the water refurbishing the reservoir either from rain water or through water seeping into the reservoir from the northern ridge of Tripoli mountain which is inclined, along with these layers, toward the sea. This is in addition to the abundant flood water carried by the ravines into this reservoir.

Al-Jabal al-Gharbi or Tripoli mountain (Naffusah mountain) has four levels of underground water, namely:

The first level is the highest [closest to ground surface] and is found where there are abundant rains. The water-bearing layers of this level are very thick, as in Yafran and Kaklah. Even though some of the water springs of this level, such as the two al-Rumiyah springs, yield abundant quantities, the level is very sensitive to the summer drought and hardly forms a water level in the full sense of the word at this time. This level has been formed where the calcareous rock layers meet with the layers of marl mixed with sand. This level is the source of four springs at the peripheries of al-Asabi'ah. This level also supplies the wells of al-Sawadimah, especially the two al-Rumiyah springs that used to supply Yafran with water during the Turkish era. A little to the west, this level supplies the two al-Zarqa' springs and the two al-Khalayifah springs, in addition to a number of wells in al-Zarqa' valley.

Second level: It is found in the calcareous rock formation in Nalut where this formation meets with a thin layer of yellow marl, gypsum and sand. It is the most important level due to the thickness of the Nalut calcareous rock layer and its proximity to the ground surface. Numerous fresh water springs emanate from this level, such as Nalut springs and al-'Uyun al-Thamani springs in Tirkit valley, the two springs in Tirkit village, the springs of al-Khirbah and the springs of Fabaw, Wadi al-Shaykh and al-Harabah. Wells are usually drilled in the valleys close to the springs, except in Kaklah and Yafran areas where they are drilled in the upper surface of the plateau.

Umm al-Qirab springs are located near a waterfall close to Wadi Ghadw and are at a depth of 20 meters below ground surface. This area also contains most of D. yar al-Buhaybat springs, al-Hayy Asfal springs and Tawghat spring. The springs in the areas of Jadu and al-Rujban get their water from this same level.

The third level is located 15-20 meters below the preceding level. There is a chain of springs at the meeting point of the calcareous rock formation with the layer comprised of calcareous, marl and sand rocks or of the marl and sand rocks. The second and third levels merge because the water of the wells and springs of the third level gushing out from the gravelly beds of valleys is possibly mixed with the waters of the second level. The waters of both levels are often mixed in a number of springs, such as Ghadhiyah spring and Kadaw spring in the Awlad Khalifah area in al-Zintan and the springs of Awlad al-S'ud village. This third level is relatively important because the sandy marl rock on which the Nalut calcareous rock formation is based allows a degree of water seepage, as in the case of Kabaw, al-Harabah and al-Ruhaybat wells. The importance of this level escalates east of Jadu where water flow from the second level decreases in the areas of al-Rujban, al-Zintan and al-Rabayinah. The most important of the seven springs in al-Rujban valley is al-Sharsharah spring which gushes out in the form of a beautiful waterfall flowing out of a big cleft in the sandy marl rock formation at the bottom of the village of Awlad Barahimah. The water flow from al-Shirsharah spring, located north of Tarhmanah, is estimated at 152 cubic meters per day.

Fourth level: The springs at the foot of the mountain, near al-Jifarah ridge, emanate from this level. These are small springs producing water with a low degree of salinity. Some of the springs emanate from al-Waylidi level at the lower foothills of the mountain, such as Qasr al-Hajj, Shakshuk, al-Jawsh and Tiji springs. There then follows a chain of springs pouring out of the beds of the valleys that cross the water-bearing layers. There is a large number of these springs which yield a small volume of water. Moreover, these springs don't yield water regularly because they depend on running water in the valleys, a source which is also irregular. Wells are drilled at the lower parts of the valleys, near the mouths of these valleys. The wells also produce irregularly and have to be drilled deeper the further we move from the mountain ridge.

The second part of the study [article] pertains to the eastern part of the Jamahiriyah, namely al-Jabal al-Akhdar and Benghazi plain. The area of this part amounts to 22,000 square kilometers. It is 300-kilometers long and has a maximum width of 80 kilometers. It is sharply inclined toward the north and the west and less so toward the south. Rain reflects the impact of altitude, location and distance from the sea. Rainfall is abundant in the higher elevations and the coastal areas in the north and the west. Rainfall varies greatly from year to year. For example, rainfall ranges annually from 200 to 600 millimeters in Shahhat and 110 to 535 millimeters in Benghazi. Heavy rainfall occurs over a limited number of days annually, ranging at the average from 40 to 80 days. The rainy season is confined to the period between October and March, with most of the rain falling in December and January. In light of the average rainfall, al-Jabal [mountain] gets nearly 10X4.4 cubic meters of water, including 10X2.8 cubic meters which fall on the northern foothills [figures as published in English in the original]. It is not easy to estimate the relationship between

the loss and gain factors in al-Jabal areas, and it is impossible to make this estimate for al-Jabal in its entirety, because the surface flow, evaporation and seepage coefficients are not known. However, the widespread presence of rugged slopes and the high rate of water seepage where calcareous rocks with their special characteristics are found does not permit a high degree of evaporation because these factors do not allow water, especially along the northern slopes, to remain over ground surface for a long period of time. Consequently, there is a big difference in the degree of evaporation between the northern and southern foothills.

Al-Jabal al-Akhdar is characterized by the presence of two ridges that confine between them a course from which most of the fast-flowing streams flowing into the sea emanate. The first ridge extends from the south to the northwest and then proceeds east and reaches an altitude of 300 meters near the sea by the effect of the various streams that cross it [sic]. This ridge runs parallel to the second ridge which is at a higher altitude toward the center. However, the distance between the two ridges or the width of the path located between them narrows in the direction of the east. The change in the [water] level in one of the two ridges is generally equal to the change in the other. This means that the two levels rise and drop simultaneously. Therefore, the difference between the two levels ranges generally from 120-200 meters.

If the average rainfall in al-Jabal al-Akhdar is taken into consideration, the total rainfall volume is estimated at more than 3.5 billion cubic meters annually, a part of which seeps underground, another part is consumed by cultivation and evaporation and the rest flows into running streams that are lost mainly to the sea. To make use of the volume that is lost in the sea and to exploit it for irrigation and other purposes, various studies have been conducted to build dams and reservoirs. This is in addition to the goal of protecting the major cities, such as Benghazi and Darnah, which are often exposed to the danger of the floods caused by the agglomeration of running water in the wake of rain storms. This danger emanates from the fact that these cities are located close to the mouths of the valleys. Another goal of the construction of such dams and reservoirs is to exploit the rain water to refurbish the underground water reservoir. A number of retention dams have also been built in the valleys penetrating al-Jabal al-Akhdar agricultural projects so that they may slow down the onrush of the running water and protect the soil against erosion.

For example, the dams that have been built and the ones under study and construction in this area include Wadi al-Qawd dam for water storage, two earthen dams to store water in Wadi Darnah, 10 protection dams and 23 obstruction dams in the same valley, Wadi al-Bab dam for water storage, the stone-built obstruction dams in Ghawt al-Sultan and Wadi al-Qattarah dam. The executive authority of al-Jabal al-Akhdar project has also built three coated ground-level dams to collect a part of the rain water with a total capacity of 29,500 cubic meters so that the water may be used partially for irrigation in the area of Yattah in the dry periods.

It is well known that rain water in this area seeps through the barriers, fissures and clefts that are found in abundance in the calcareous rocks of this area to form underground water basins and reservoirs. Such water is found at a shallow depth in the coastal area, gathering on top of the saline sea water. The water level gets deeper gradually the higher we move up the mountain [al-Jabal al-Akhdar]. The average hydraulic inclination of the underground water generally becomes one meter deeper for every 4 or 5 kilometers. The underground water level varies according to the volume of water supplying the underground reservoir by seepage through the rock layers after the rainy season and according to the volume of water pumped out of this reservoir. The level is also influenced by the water inclination. In the high areas, water is found at a relatively steep depth ranging from 300 to 500 meters. This depth decreases in the first ridge and reaches nearly 200 meters. This water is of good quality because it is remote and free of the seepage of sea water into it.

Water near the coast is close to the surface, especially in the parts adjacent to mouths of the valleys. The water follows the contours of the land and flows toward the sea in the north and toward the marshland and the desert in the south. The main areas where studies on the underground water potentials have been conducted are the areas of Benghazi plain, al-Marj plain, al-Abyar plain and the southern part of al-Jabal al-Akhdar. The main underground reservoir is located in the Benghazi plain within the fissures and barriers penetrating the calcareous rock layers formed in the miocene period. The underground water potentials in this area are good. The thickness of the water-bearing layer ranges from 50 to 60 meters. It is expected that the volume of water that will be possible to pump out will amount to nearly 11 million cubic meters annually.

In al-Marj plain, the geological, hydraulic and geophysical studies have indicated the presence of three levels or layers that bear water:

The first water level is found in the clay and silt deposits formed in the quaternary period of the pleistocene age of the recent epoch. This level is shallow and contains a small volume of water with a high degree of salinity.

The second level is found in the parastic, sand and gravel deposits formed in the pliocene epoch of the tertiary period. The depth of this level ranges from 25 to 90 meters. The level contains a limited volume of water with a high degree of salinity which increases the further we move toward the center of the plain.

The third level in al-Marj plain is found in the calcareous rock deposits formed in the eocene epoch. This layer or level is considered the most important underground water layer in al-Marj plain. The water quality of this level is good and its depth ranges from 150 to 500 meters.

If we proceed to al-Abyar plain, we find that its underground water is found in two distinctive layers or levels. Geologically, these two layers date back to the oligocene and miocene epochs.

The depth of the underground water in the first level ranges from 80 to 120 meters whereas in the second level it ranges at times from 200 to 300 meters. Some of the studies conducted on the area located east of al-Rajmah-al-Abyar road have demonstrated that this area is the most suitable for pumping out the water and drilling wells.

There are two low areas south of al-Jabal al-Akhdar, namely the areas of al-Mukhayli and al-Kharrubah, which contain underground water in abundance. A number of wells can be drilled in these two areas to permit pumping out 1,200 to 1,800 liters per second during the next 10 years.

According to the abovementioned, the climatic conditions, summed up in the relatively heavy rainfall, and the geological and hydraulic conditions--the presence of porous layers consisting of calcareous, marl and clay rock formations and the presence of numerous faults, fissures, caverns and (carstic) and calcareous drains--have turned al-Jabal al-Akhdar area into an area rich with springs and streams. The valleys, whose beds are drilled to get to the various underground water levels, are considered, along with the clefts, the most important sources of spring water. Between the towns of al-Abraq and Massah, there is a chain of springs connected with the presence of a thick clay layer belonging to the eocene epoch. North of this chain, another belt extends between al-Fayidiyah and al-Qubbah and the gushing of springs in this area is attributed to the presence of another clay layer dating back to the lower oligocene epoch. Because the mountain represents a domed curve in which the layers incline on its two sides toward the east and the west, the level of the springs drops the further you drop toward the east and the west. The lower the level drops, the more abundantly the water flows, as in the case of Marah springs located in the eastern part of the higher level.

The third belt of springs is located between the higher ridge of the mountain and the coast where calcareous rocks of the miocene epoch prevail. These thick layers of rock cross the valleys and even penetrate them until they reach the layers of the eocene epoch that extend directly under these calcareous layers. This is in addition to the presence of numerous small refractions parallel to the coast where there are numerous water springs in al-Latrun and Ra's Hilal areas. This is in addition to the numerous calcareous rock barriers existing in this area. The number of big water springs in the area is estimated at 100 springs that produce 500 liters of water per second.

The most important springs in al-Jabal al-Akhdar area are the Wadi Darnah springs that are located at a distance of 3.5 kilometers from the city of Darnah in the fan-shaped delta of Wadi Darnah. The water produced by these springs, estimated at 100 liters per second, flows through a concrete canal on the western side of the valley. A part of the water is lost through seepage and evaporation and the rest is used to irrigate some orchards and lands in Wadi Darnah and for drinking by the inhabitants of Darnah. The Bu Mansur spring, located above the Darnah spring and at

a distance of 14 kilometers from the city of Darnah, is estimated to produce 120 liters of water per second. This water flows through a canal on the eastern side of the valley and a large part of it, amounting to nearly 70 percent of the total volume, is lost by seepage and evaporation. Al-Bilad spring supplies drinking water to the city of Tobruk.

The most important of the Wadi Marah springs are the five springs in this valley which constitutes a branch of Wadi al-Naqah. Wadi Marah is a shallow ravine that gets its water from a drainage area of about 23 square miles. The springs in this valley include those of Shu'ayb and Mafarah which produce 20 liters per second and the water flows through a concrete canal on the right side of the valley. Al-Safa group of springs consists of four springs that produce 60 to 70 liters per second.

Al-Latrun spring is located at the end of Wadi al-Saqi which abounds with springs, the most important of which is al-Dabbusiyyah spring whose water has been recently supplied to al-Marj whereas it used to be exploited in the past to irrigate some lands. Al-Latrun spring is considered the most copious in the coastal area. Its yield is estimated at 80 liters per second. An obstruction dam has been constructed in the valley to divert the spring water to a concrete canal extending along the northern side of this valley.

We finally get to the third part or the southern area of Fezzan where rain falls sporadically. The general picture in the area is that of the absence of rainfall for several years and then a heavy downpour for a short period of time. This phenomenon is identical to what happens in many deserts of the world. The annual rainfall in Fezzan area is nearly 8 millimeters. Consequently, rain is not considered a source of water in this area and it cannot be relied upon for agricultural, construction, population and economic expansion. But despite this, we find that the tremendous expansion proceeding in wide and rapid steps in this area--considered the biggest agricultural expansion throughout the Jamahiriyyah--depends fundamentally on the enormous water potentials of the big underground water reservoir that lies under this area and that is considered a great blessing from God because it is one of the biggest underground reservoirs in the desert area. The water of this reservoir is fresh, considering that salt concentrations amount to 50 parts per million in the areas of (Marzaq) and Taragin and nearly 200 parts per million in the area of Wadi al-Ajal. The water is found in several layers or levels that are separated from each other by hard layers that make it possible to exploit each water layer separately to irrigate large areas of land without affecting the other layers. This enormous underground reservoir is called the (Marzaq) reservoir. The depth of the various levels or layers currently exploited for the agricultural expansion projects in this area ranges from 80 meters to 600 meters. Some of the layers have an artesian pressure, such as the layer from which the wells of Wadi al-Qat' project draw their water. The yield per well amounts to 300 cubic meters per hour. This layer is also the one that supplies the wells of Tamezaf (Tahala) for the Chat-al-Waynat project where the yield amounts to 200 cubic meters per well.

per hour. In the Sabha project area, a layer of underground water at a depth ranging from 80 to 300 meters is being exploited. Studies are currently underway to exploit deeper layers located at a depth of nearly 1,300 meters. The yield from such a depth amounts to 150 cubic meters per well per hour. This promises the possibility of exploiting this new layer for the new agricultural expansion projects in the area.

This is in addition to the surface or shallow layer on which the inhabitants depend for their farms and for the drinking water projects of the town of Sabha which is witnessing a construction renaissance and an increase in population year after year. Generally, the Nubian (al-Nubi) and the Devonian-Silurian levels are considered the most important water layers in the area, with the latter being the most important.

The springs in the area are divided into ordinary springs whose level is at times surface level--such springs are numerous on the western coast and the most important are springs of the villages Qayrah, Dabdab, Brach, Adra and Tamsan--and artesian wells whose waters gush out to the surface. Such wells are found in some of the abovementioned villages as well as other villages, such as al-Dawaymah, Ashkadah, Mahtuqah and Wanzarik.

The wells are divided into shallow wells with depths ranging from 4-25 meters--such wells are often surrounded by marshes and are abundant in the central and eastern parts of the coast--and a second kind of wells that are deep, with depths ranging from 150-400 meters, and that yield up to 500 cubic meters per well per hour.

Wadi al-Shati' is one of the few valleys in Fezzan area where the pressure of deep underground water is high, thus allowing the water to rush to the surface by natural pressure which reaches in some areas sixfold the atmospheric pressure. Reservoirs are built in Wadi al-Shati' projects to store this water and to distribute it to the farms through modern irrigation networks of an excellent technical standard.

Wadi al-Ajal does not have springs but contains many wells. This valley is characterized by the availability of large areas of cultivable lands which can be reclaimed and cultivated when supplied with the needed water. This is why Wadi al-Ajal has been one of the first areas in which complete agricultural development projects have been implemented. A total of 139 farms were built in the area and were distributed to the farmers on the sixth anniversary of the 1 September revolution.

It has become evident from the geological and hydraulic studies and from tests on water samples from the valley that the deep layer contains fresher water than the surface layers that are being exploited by the farmers. Their water-bearing layers have been found to exist in the valley at depths of 100 meters, 250 meters, 400 meters and 550 meters. This is in addition to the surface layer from which the farmers get their water and which has a depth ranging from 10 to 40 meters.

A total of 109 productive wells have been drilled, each producing an average of 70 cubic meters in Ashari and al-Fejayj. Twelve productive wells have also been drilled in al-Abyad site and three wells in al-Disah site.

In the (Marzaq) project area, hydraulic studies have indicated that this area contains a surface layer at a depth of 10 to 70 meters and a deep layer at 110 to 714 meters. Both layers are characterized by an artesian quality and by a good quality of water fit for irrigation. Numerous wells have been drilled in both layers in the resettlement projects of Marzaq, al-Qatrun, Umm al-Arunib, al-Humayrah, Zawaylah and Ghadwah and in the production projects in Taraghin and al-Baknasah.

The area of Ghat and al-'Uwaynat is located southwest of Sabha and is dominated by a dry desert climate. This area is bordered on the west by the Republic of Algeria, on the north by Ashari and on the east by Marzaq.

Rain rarely falls in this area. Underground water is the only source and the inhabitants rely in their agriculture on 19 natural springs distributed over the areas of Ghat, (al-Barkat) and al-'Uwaynat. These springs yield a small volume of water which they derive from the surface layer.

The farms belonging to the inhabitants are irrigating by the method of flooding, relying on the water springs in the area that are sufficient for the cultivation of only small areas due to the meagerness of the water resources and to their uneconomical use.

Geological and hydraulic studies and soil studies have been conducted in the area and have shown that the yield of the three wells drilled in the area of Ghat ranges from (0.3) cubic meters per hour to 1 cubic meters per hour from depths ranging from 61 meters to 410 meters whereas the yield from the Tamesst area wells varied from 30 cubic meters to 292 cubic meters per hour (per well) at depths ranging from 130 meters to 350 meters. Consequently, it has become obvious that the potentials of underground water in Ghat area are somewhat good and that this fact must be taken into consideration in the case of agricultural expansion in this area.

If we move east, away from the southwestern part of the Libyan desert, we find al-Bafrah and al-Bari basins where 10 villages are scattered over an area of 120 square kilometers. These basins are considered the most important agriculturally. Underground water is found in this area in the form of a basin known as Marjay basin. Great quantities of water are available in al-Bafrah and al-Bari basins. Al-Bafrah basin alone contains nearly 25,000 cubic kilometers (25,000 km³) of good-quality water.

Hydrologically, al-Bafrah basin is considered a part of a major water belt located in the southeastern portion of the Sahabiriyah and extending to Chad, Sudan and Egypt. The underground water is found within the

(bounds of the porous calcareous rock formation) at the center of the basin. This water is of excellent quality and contains 500 [parts of salt] per million parts.

In 1972, numerous wells were drilled in the form of a field containing more than 100 productive wells in al-Kufrah production project. The wells were drilled at depths reaching 300 meters. Each has a production capacity amounting to 76 liters per second and is fitted with an automatic rotary sprinkler system which irrigates an area of 100 hectares in 60 hours. The distance between one well and the other is nearly 1,100 meters. With the use of some fertilizer and constant irrigation in this area with its coarse grain of sand, it has been possible to obtain a good crop of clover.

In 1974-75, another field of water wells consisting of 35 wells was drilled in al-Kufrah resettlement project which is adjacent to al-Kufrah production project. The wells here are deeper than those in al-Kufrah production project--their depth reaching 500 meters. The yield of these wells is twice or threefold that of al-Kufrah production project wells, thus indicating that the second water layer is more abundant than the first layer.

At a distance of 400 kilometers north of al-Kufrah field of water wells, we find al-Sarir area. Hydraulically, the water reservoir in al-Sarir area is considered a multi-layer reservoir. The furthest depth of these layers or of the sediments saturated with water is nearly 850 meters. These layers are located in the center of the reservoir. The depth of the water belt or level in the area ranges from 30-60 meters. Numerous initial and detailed tests and geological and hydraulic studies were conducted in the area in 1975 and a proposal was made for drilling a field of water wells comprised of 159 wells divided over lines extending from the east to the west, with 15 wells in every line, a distance of 2.5 kilometers between one well and another and a distance of 10 kilometers between one line and another. The depth of the filters in these wells ranged from 150-300 meters. In 1977, 100 wells were exploited for the winter grain crop. The yield of each well amounted to 76 liters per second and each well was able to irrigate 80 hectares.

The geological age of al-Sarir basin dates back to the middle post-miocene epoch which is considered fundamentally the epoch of the formation of the water reservoirs belt.

A field of water wells was also built to supply water to the northern al-Sarir production project. A total of 76 wells have been drilled at depths of nearly 300 meters and with filters [masafi] located at depths ranging from 150-300 meters. The water in this project is fresh and suitable for irrigation. Its electric conductivity ranges from 1,100 to 1,900 (micromhos). The production capacity of the wells ranges from 18-66 cubic meters per hour.

A considerable underground water reservoir is also found at a distance of nearly 40 kilometers southwest of Jalu oasis. The thickness of the saturated layer or the water-bearing layer of this reservoir reaches 87 meters.

The water level is at a depth of 83 meters from the ground surface in Jalu oas'is. A total of 33 wells have been drilled in three parallel and equal lines separated by a distance of 12 kilometers. The yield per well has amounted to nearly 36 liters per second.

It is believed, after discovery of al-Sarir canal, that the sources refurbishing al-Kufrah basin are the rains that fall in the distant areas to the south, such as Ardi, (Ayindi) and Tibesti Mountains where rainfall ranges from 250-750 millimeters [annually], keeping in mind that there are numerous theories that explain the sources of this basin.

Brother reader, we have tried in this article to cast a simple glance at the water resources of one of our Arab countries, namely the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah which is witnessing a large-scale and ambitious agricultural renaissance. In future meetings with you, we will try, God willing, to shed light on the water resources in another part of the greater Arab homeland.

8494

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ANTICOMMANDO UNIT--In December, Raymond Sasia, the head of the security department of the ministry of the interior and former bodyguard of General de Gaulle, Robert Broussard, chief of the anticrime brigade, and a captain in the strike group of the national gendarmerie went to Morocco to help establish, at the request of King Hassan II, a Moroccan anticommando unit. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 7 Jan 80 p 27]

CSO: 4400

'AL-'URUBAH' CLAIMS UNITED STATES FORCING IRAN TO TURN ELSEWHERE FOR HELP

Doha AL-'URUBAH in Arabic 29 Nov 79 p 3

[Editorial: "Washington and Threat of Using Force"]

[Text] If the U.S. administration decides to carry out its threat to use force against the Iranian revolution, then this administration will have decided to plough the sea and, thus, to sink in the Iranian quicksands.

It seems that the passage of some time over the Vietnamese lesson has caused the U.S. administration to forget or to ignore its results. Thus, we find the heroic threats of invasion again floating over the surface of the events.

The problem of Washington is that it doesn't fully comprehend the lessons of the recent history and does not possess the ability to understand revolutions with a rational logic.

The U.S. administration which was accustomed in the shah's time to having the ruler in Tehran as the representative of its interests and dreams in Iran finds it hard to accept a new regime that considers only the interest of its country and its people. At one time Washington lost Egypt's friendship because it did not understand 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Egyptian revolution. Since the time of Washington's confrontation with 'Abd-al-Nasir, the sentiments of the Arab masses have been hostile to Washington. This hostility continues until the present because the U.S. administration's sympathies have been with Israel while all its interests are with the Arabs.

Recent history gives us a living example of the U.S. administration's muddling. It is well known that Dr Fidel Castro led the Cuban revolutionaries to liberate Cuba from the rule of dictator Battista.

When Cuba was liberated by the revolutionaries, Washington failed to understand the fact and its negative positions motivated Castro to ask for aid from Moscow. At the time, Castro was not a communist but the U.S. policy forced the leader of the Cuban revolutionaries to adopt Marxism, and so forth.

At present, we find the United States planning to push the Iranian revolution to the other coast, thus repeating its mistakes with 'Abd-al-Nasir and Castro. Had Washington comprehended the lessons of the recent history, it would have--instead of provoking Tehran and challenging the Iranian people's feelings--acted differently.

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CSO: 4802

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

MESSAGE FROM 'ARAFAT--Tunis, Jan 15 (TAP)--President Bourguiba received a message from Mr Yasir 'Arafat, president of the PLO Executive Committee as a response to the telegram he sent him on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Palestinian revolution. Mr Yasir 'Arafat praises in this message, Tunisia's firm stands in favor of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation in their struggle against Zionism and imperialism and reaffirms the Palestinian resistance involvement in the way of revolution until the liberation of the Holy City of Jerusalem and the recovery of Arab rights spoiled by Zionism in Palestine. Mr Hedi Nouira, prime minister and Mr Mohamed Fitouri, foreign minister, received similar messages from Mr Yasir 'Arafat and Mr Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO Political Department. [Text] [LD151509 Tunis TAP in English 1405 GMT 15 Jan 80 LD]

U.S. OFFICIALS RECEIVED--Tunis, Jan 15 (TAP)--Tunisian Premier Hedi Nouira received Tuesday morning U.S. Congressman Paul Simon who was accompanied by Mr Stephen W. Bosworth, U.S. Ambassador in Tunis. At the end of the talk, Mr Simon said he had made with the prime minister a survey of the main current international issues and pointed out the American people's affection for Tunisia. Then Mr Simon was received by Foreign Minister Mohamed Fitouri. [Text] [LD151510 Tunis TAP in English 1403 GMT 15 Jan 80 LD]

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